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Introduction
Nearly thirty years ago, the “Tech Rapist” terrorized students at Texas Tech
University.1 Michele Mallin became the fifth victim when a tall, chain-smoking
man with a knife forced himself into Mallin’s car, drove her to a vacant field,
and raped her.2 At some point, the Lubbock police department focused its
investigation on Timothy Cole, a black Texas Tech student employed at a pizzeria
near the location of Mallin’s assault, who had allegedly flirted with an undercover
police officer.3 Despite her difficulty seeing her attacker, Mallin identified a color
Polaroid of Cole—presented amid a collage of black and white mug shots—as
her attacker.4 She identified Cole again in a physical lineup.5 Law enforcement
provided positive feedback to Mallin for “correct” identifications throughout the
process.6 Every time she viewed a picture of Cole over the next year, her initial
uncertainty faded, allowing her to unambiguously identify Cole from the witness
stand at trial.7 Although Cole had several alibi witnesses, no physical evidence
linking him to the crime, and an asthmatic condition inconsistent with a chain
See Fred B. McKinley, The Cole Truth, Tex. Observer (Nov. 17, 2010), http://www.texas
observer.org/the-cole-truth/.
1

2
Wade Goodwyn, Family of Man Cleared by DNA Still Seeks Justice, NPR Morning
Edition (Feb. 5, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=100249923.
3

Id.

Jena Williams, Cole Case, Tex. Monthly (Feb. 2009), http://www.texasmonthly.com/
story/cole-case.
4

Featured Exoneration—Timothy Cole, Innocence Project
ipoftexas.org/featured-exoneration-timothy-cole.
5

6

of

Tex. (2013), http://www.

Williams, supra note 4.

Rick Casey, A Tale of Twin Traumas, The Hous. Chron., Aug. 5, 2009, at B1. Mallin
has used her experience to join exonerees and victims in filing court briefs regarding the problems
of suggestive identification procedures. See generally Brief for Amici Curiae Wilton Dedge et al.
in Support of Petitioner, Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012) (No. 10-8974), 2011
WL 3584756.
7
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smoker, Mallin’s eyewitness testimony persuaded a jury to convict Cole of raping
two women.8 He received a sentence of twenty-five years in prison.9 Years after
Cole died in prison from an asthma attack, the actual Tech Rapist confessed to the
crimes.10 DNA testing confirmed the confession. In 2009, Cole received the first
posthumous exoneration in Texas history.11 That exoneration helped spur Texas to
take partial ownership of its mistakes, passing the Tim Cole Act, one of the most
powerful compensation statutes in the United States.12
Many features of Cole’s story are unusual, but the circumstances of his wrongful
conviction are not. Legal and technological developments reveal a troubling
number of innocent prisoners.13 As of 2014, at least 312 individuals, including
one Wyoming resident, have used DNA testing and statutory post-conviction
procedures to prove their factual innocence.14 DNA testing can exclude a person
as the source of biological evidence at a crime scene to an unprecedented degree
of certainty. If not for the “divine intervention” of DNA testing (or some other
form of newly discovered evidence), post-conviction innocence claims would
have never received credibility from a justice system that places great weight on
finality and the fact finding prowess of juries. Yet the relative rarity of biological
evidence conducive to DNA testing suggests a larger, undetected number of
innocent prisoners.
Post-conviction innocence claims generate intense, often emotional, debates
between lawyers, policymakers, and the public regarding the nature or existence
of wrongful convictions.15 Prisoners, victims, and their respective families have
strong feelings about dredging up the details of past traumas. Additionally,
innocence claims threaten the faith we place in the criminal justice system to
protect us from harm, which can create intense anxiety. This article argues
8

Goodwyn, supra note 2.

9

Id.

10

Id.

11

DNA in 1985 Rape Exonerates Man Who Died Behind Bars, L.A. Times, Feb. 7, 2009, at 12.

Tex. Code Ann. §§ 103.001–103.154. In addition to health benefits, child support
payments, tuition credits, and other services, Texas’s statute provides compensation of $80,000 per
year of wrongful incarceration, plus $25,000 per year spent on parole or as a registered sex offender.
Id. § 103.052.
12

13
See generally Tim Bakken, Models of Justice to Protect Innocent Persons, 56 N.Y.L. Sch. L.
Rev. 837 (2011–2012); Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual
Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 761 (2007).
14
DNA Exoneree Case Profiles, The Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
know/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2014).
15
See, e.g., Keith A. Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 Alb. L. Rev. 1157, 1157–58 (2010–2011)
(describing the innocence revolution and ensuing debates); Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism,
2008 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1549, 1552–58 (2008) (describing criticisms of innocence movement); Morris
B. Hoffman, The ‘Innocence’ Myth, Wall St. J., Apr. 26, 2007, at A19 (attacking the “myth of
factual innocence”).
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that Wyoming policymakers, lawyers, and citizens should directly confront
this anxiety, rather than continue to use the coping mechanisms of denial and
repression, by taking factual innocence claims seriously and instituting policy
reforms to rectify and prevent wrongful convictions. In contrast to traditional
procedural methods of challenging convictions, post-conviction innocence claims
can trigger an innocence event, forcing the criminal justice system’s gatekeepers
to confront the causes of unjust imprisonment.16 While this process provokes
uncomfortable feelings, we have an ethical duty to work through this anxiety,
rather than continue to displace it onto innocent prisoners and exonerees.
This article begins by examining how the criminal justice system attempts
to apprehend, convict, and punish criminals, including theoretical justifications
for punishment, traditional methods of forensic identification, and procedural
safeguards against infringement on individual rights.17 Second, it discusses the
development of DNA testing and how it enabled a revolution in uncovering and
correcting wrongful convictions.18 Third, this article discusses the evolution of
post-conviction remedies, which made exoneration a practical reality for hundreds
of innocent people.19 Finally, this article examines what Wyoming lawyers and
policymakers can learn from post-conviction innocence claims by discussing
(1) the understandable anxiety and resistance spurred by post-conviction
innocence claims,20 (2) the substantial benefits of engaging this anxiety,21 (3) the
mixed effectiveness of Wyoming’s post-conviction innocence laws,22 and (4) the
uncertain prospects for future reforms to continue Wyoming’s ongoing process of
preventing and remedying wrongful convictions.23

I. Who to Punish?
This section examines why standard procedures for determining guilt often
fail to protect the innocent. Part A examines the theoretical rationales for ensuring
that the criminal justice system punishes only guilty individuals.24 Part B looks
at the shortcomings of traditional forensic identification methods, including

This article uses “innocence event” to refer to the process in which post-conviction
innocence claims, often aided by DNA testing evidence, force lawyers, judges, and the public to
reconsider assumptions regarding the accuracy and effectiveness of criminal justice procedures. See
infra Part IV.B.
16

17

See infra notes 24–204 and accompanying text.

18

See infra notes 123–91 and accompanying text.

19

See infra notes 198–290 and accompanying text.

20

See infra notes 304–38 and accompanying text.

21

See infra notes 348– 87 and accompanying text.

22

See infra notes 389–516 and accompanying text.

23

See infra notes 517–44 and accompanying text.

24

See infra notes 26–49 and accompanying text.
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eyewitness testimony and forensic “science,” used to ensure that the justice system
punishes the guilty.25

A. Theoretical Background
Scholars offer two dominant justifications for apprehending and punishing
criminals.26 First, it may serve the utilitarian (also known as consequentialist) goal
of maximizing happiness for the greatest number of people by reducing crime. 27
From this perspective, punishment is justified if the benefits of reducing crime
outweigh the costs of incarceration.28 Utilitarians offer different theories for why
punishment achieves these benefits: (1) rehabilitation, (2) incapacitation, and
(3) deterrence:
Rehabilitation prevents crime by curing the offender of her
abnormal criminal propensities, for her own and the community’s
sake. Incapacitation prevents the abnormally dangerous offender
from committing crime, not by curing her, but by making it
impossible for her (or at least limiting the circumstances in
which she can) act on her tendencies. And deterrence prevents
crime by scaring the offender away from future crime (specific
deterrence) or by making an example of the offender to others,
thus scaring them away from crime (general deterrence).29
While rehabilitation continues to provide a potential justification for punishment,30
its influence in the United States criminal justice system has diminished in
recent years.31
25

See infra notes 50–122 and accompanying text.

26

United States v. Hawkins, 380 F. Supp. 2d 143, 148 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).

Classical utilitarianism prioritizes providing the greatest good for the greatest number of
people. Consequentialism, Stan. Encyclopedia of Phil. (Sept. 27, 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/consequentialism/#ClaUti (citing Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles
of Morals and Legislation (1789); John S. Mill, Utilitarianism (Roger Crisp ed., 1998); Henry
Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (7th ed. 1907)). See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 1.02 & cmt.
b(1) (Tentative Draft No. 1 2007).
27

Hawkins, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 148 (“[The utilitarian view] holds that the purpose of
the criminal law is to prevent or reduce the incidence of behavior that is viewed as antisocial.”
(quoting Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 11 (1968)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
28

29
Id. (quoting Markus D. Dubber & Mark G. Kelman, American Criminal Law: Cases,
Statutes and Comments 1 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Michele Cotton,
Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment,
37 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1313, 1316 (2000).
30

See Model Penal Code, supra note 27, § 1.02 & cmt. b(1).

See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2012) (“[I]mprisonment is not an appropriate means of
promoting correction and rehabilitation.”); Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2391
(2011); Francis A. Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal: Penal Policy and Social
Purpose (1981).
31
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Second, punishing criminals serves retributive goals by giving “just deserts”
to people who violate the law.32 This perspective views individuals as “responsible
moral agent[s] to whom rewards are due when [they] make[] right moral choices
and to whom punishment is due when [they] make[] wrong ones.”33 The very act
of committing a crime merits punishment as an end in itself.34 From a retributive
stance, we punish not to achieve some greater good, but as a way of showing
our respect for the dignity and rights people possess as rational, autonomous
human beings.35
Convicting innocent people arguably defeats both purposes of criminal
punishment. From a retributive perspective, someone who has not broken the
law does not deserve punishment.36 Even worse, imprisoning an innocent person
represents a profound disrespect for individual dignity and liberty, the very values
that justify retributive punishment in the first place. Imprisoning the innocent
may be easier to justify from a pure utilitarian perspective. For example, punishing
the wrong person for an actual crime may send a deterrent signal to society.37
This view is less tenable in light of DNA testing’s ability to ferret out wrongful
convictions. This can allow utilitarian theorists to argue that publicizing wrongful
32
E.g., Model Penal Code, supra note 27, § 1.02 & cmt. b(1); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)
(2012). There is some doubt as to whether criminal punishment has been tailored to have much
deterrent or rehabilitative effect, the largest focus appearing to be on retributive perspectives,
notwithstanding many judges’ stated preference for utilitarian considerations in imposing sentences.
Michael H. Marcus, Comments on the Model Penal Code: Sentencing Preliminary Draft No. 1, 30 Am.
J. Crim. L. 135, 142– 44 (2003).
33
Hawkins, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 148 (quoting Packer, supra note 28, at 9) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
34

Cotton, supra note 29, at 1315. According to Cotton,
All these terms communicate the idea that punishment is directed at imposing merited
harm upon the criminal for his wrong, and not at the achievement of social benefits.
Retribution, as distinguished from utilitarian purposes, is conceived as necessary even
when social benefit will not be achieved. It is this perspective that led Kant to say that
“[e]ven if civil society were to dissolve itself with the consent of all its members . . .
the last murderer in prison would first have to be executed in order that each should
receive his deserts and that the people should not bear the guilt of a capital crime
through failing to insist on its punishment.”

Id. at 1315–16 (quoting Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, in Kant: Pol. Writings 131,
156 (H.B. Nisbet trans., Hans Reiss ed., 1991)).
35
Eric L. Muller, The Virtue of Mercy in Criminal Sentencing, 24 Seton Hall L. Rev. 288,
293 (1993) (citing Jeffrie G. Murphy, Retribution, Justice and Therapy 68 (1979)); see also R.A.
Duff, Trials and Punishments 6 –7 (1986); Herbert Morris, On Guilt and Innocence 48–49
(1976); Igor Primoratz, Justifying Legal Punishment 12 (1989).
36

Duff, supra note 35, at 154.

See Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just” Punishment,
96 NW. U. L. Rev. 843, 862 (2002) (describing this argument); Lea Brilmayer, Conflict of Laws:
Foundations and Future Directions 202 (1991) (using this argument to criticize utilitarianism).
See generally Henrik Lando, Does Wrongful Conviction Lower Deterrence?, 35 J. Legal Stud.
327 (2006).
37
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convictions undermines punishment’s deterrent effect.38 Moreover, wrongful
convictions risk damaging the public’s respect for the legitimacy of the criminal
justice system—creating the perception that the state engages in the very kinds of
lawlessness that the justice system was designed to stop.39
Of course, an absolutist utilitarian stance cannot eliminate the possibility
that punishing the innocent may be justifiable if it improves society’s overall
well-being.40 Yet this approach appears more commonly as a theoretical cudgel
wielded by opponents of utilitarianism, rather than a legitimately held approach
to crime control.41 Few utilitarians appear willing to accept wrongful convictions
as a positive good. For many utilitarians, wrongful conviction appears, at best,
as an unfortunate (but perhaps necessary) consequence of protecting society
from crime,42 and, at worst, an infringement that defeats the purpose for
crime control.43
Regardless of the punishment rationale one accepts, it seems intuitive, as a
foundational matter, that there is something deeply wrong with punishing an
innocent person. Wrongful convictions represent a profound assault on our
system’s foundational principles of individual rights. The U.S. legal system is
founded on various values descended from the European enlightenment, which
place a high value on individual dignity and liberty.44 This approach is skeptical of

38
Christopher, supra note 37, at 872 (citing Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 249 (J.M. Dent &
Sons 1976) (1651); C.L. Ten, Crime, Guilt, and Punishment: A Philosophical Introduction
17–18 (1987); Stanley I. Benn, Punishment, in 7 The Encyclopedia of Phil. 29, 31 (Paul Edwards
reprint ed., 1972); Katherine J. Strandburg, Deterrence and the Conviction of the Innocent, 35 Conn.
L. Rev. 1321 (2003)).
39
Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence: The Attraction and
Limitations of the Focus on Innocence in Capital Punishment Law and Advocacy, 95 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 587, 588 (2005). According to Professors Steiker and Steiker,

[W]hen such errors are discovered, as some but by no means all of them eventually
will be, they deeply undermine the legitimacy of the entire criminal justice system.
This latter cost, though unquantifiable, is tremendously important. Public fear of
unjust violence at the hands of the state, which has a monopoly on the legitimate
use of force, is the hallmark of totalitarian regimes, one of the indices that most
distinguish them from free and democratic societies.
Id.
40

Michael Moore, Law & Psychiatry 238 (1984).

See, e.g., Brilmayer, supra note 37, at 202. But see generally Christopher, supra note 37
(arguing that retributivism justifies punishing the innocent).
41

42

See Risinger, supra note 13, at 763–64; infra note 313 and accompanying text.

43

See Christopher, supra note 37, at 872 (describing this response).

See Jordan Steiker, Incorporating the Suspension Clause: Is There a Constitutional Right to
Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 862, 895 (1994) (citing The Federalist
Nos. 23, 28 (Alexander Hamilton), Nos. 10, 51, 58, 63 (James Madison)) (arguing the framers of
the U.S. Constitution linked structural innovations to individual liberty).
44
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human institutions and therefore places checks and limits on state power.45 Many
of these limits are embodied in the guarantees enumerated by the Bill of Rights of
the U.S. Constitution.46
A legal system seeking to punish those who offend the social order without
harming the innocent therefore must balance competing interests and draw lines
regarding what criteria are sufficient to impose punishment. While the proper
placement of this line is debatable, our society chooses to err on the side of
releasing the guilty, rather than punishing the innocent. This can be seen in both
the traditional clichés derived from Lord Blackstone’s famous statement that it is
better to allow a certain number of guilty people to go free than to convict one
innocent person,47 as well as the requirement that individuals be proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.48 The Wyoming Supreme Court recognized as much
in 1986, when it noted early statistics regarding wrongful convictions, contrasted
America’s traditions of constitutional liberty with criminal justice practices in the
Soviet Union, and recognized that the benefits of convicting more criminals may
not be worth imprisoning innocent people.49 With some exceptions, we have a
social and legal consensus that punishing an innocent person is anathema to our
values. This emphasizes the fundamental need to ensure the factual reliability of
our methods of obtaining criminal convictions.

B. Forensic Identification
We live in a world of dishonest criminal actors with strong incentives to avoid
detection and punishment. Our system therefore relies on evidence, combined with
procedural safeguards, to establish a criminal’s guilt before imposing punishment.
Relevant evidence should tend to increase or decrease the probability of a fact that
is material to whether a person committed a crime.50 It should do so in a manner
See I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 949–50 (1983) (“These observations [of general
skepticism regarding the fallibility of human nature] are consistent with what many of the Framers
expressed, none more cogently than Hamilton in pointing up the need to divide and disperse
power in order to protect liberty . . . .”) (citing J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution
of the United States 383–84 (1858); The Federalist No. 62 (Alexander Hamilton)); Matthew
P. Bergman, Montesquieu’s Theory of Government and the Framing of the American Constitution, 18
Pepp. L. Rev. 1 (1990).
45

46

See U.S. Const. amends. IV, V, VI, VIII.

William Blackstone, Blackstone’s Commentaries Abridged 523 (William C. Sprague
ed., 9th ed. 1915) (“[T]he law holds that it is better that ten guilty persons escape than one innocent
suffer.”). For a discussion of Blackstone’s ratio, see Alexander Volokh, N Guilty Men, 146 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 173 (1997).
47

48

See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).

Chambers v. State, 726 P.2d 1269, 1278 (Wyo. 1986), receded from on other grounds,
Lancaster v. State, 43 P.3d 80 (Wyo. 2002).
49

See Fed. R. Evid. 401 (“Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact
more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in
determining the action.”).
50

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol14/iss2/7

8

Lyttle: Return of the Repressed: Coping with Post-Conviction Innocence Cl

2014

Return of the Repressed

563

that (1) is consistent with reliability norms51 and (2) does not create an undue
risk of unfair prejudice, confusion, delay, etc.52 Unfortunately, two of the most
persuasive forms of evidence, eyewitness identification and forensic science, have
contributed to, rather than prevented, the problem of wrongful convictions.

1. Eyewitness Identification
One of the most important types of criminal evidence consists of testimony
and identifications made by eyewitnesses. Initially, eyewitnesses must meet the
standard of competency and have personal knowledge relevant to a defendant’s
guilt.53 Witnesses may then testify that they observed defendants committing
or bearing a circumstantial relationship to a crime. Juries place an extraordinary
amount of weight on eyewitness evidence, making it a common culprit in
wrongful convictions.54 Appellate courts, in turn, give considerable deference to
juries’ guilty verdicts and findings of fact.55 In theory, a jury can then determine
witness reliability by observing live demeanor, as opposed to the seemingly less
reliable “cold record” viewed by an appellate court.56
A growing body of research demonstrates problems with our system’s faith in
a jury’s ability to properly weigh the reliability of eyewitness testimony.57 Several
See Fed. R. Evid. 702 (providing threshold requirements for the admissibility of expert
opinion testimony).
51

52
See Fed. R. Evid. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the
issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”).

See Fed. R. Evid. 601 (“Every person is competent to be a witness unless these rules provide
otherwise. But in a civil case, state law governs the witness’s competency regarding a claim or defense
for which state law supplies the rule of decision.”); Fed. R. Evid. 602 (“A witness may testify to a
matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal
knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may consist of the witness’s own
testimony.”); Wyo. R. Evid. 601 (“Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise
provided in these rules.”); Wyo. R. Evid. 602 (“A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence
is introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence
to prove personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of the testimony of the witness himself.”).
53

See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967); State v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457, 461
(N.J. 1999)
54

55
See, e.g., Grimes v. State, 2013 WY 84, ¶ 8, 304 P.3d 972, 975 (Wyo. 2013) (deferring to
the jury’s determinations regarding witness credibility and the weight of evidence); Hannifan v. Am.
Nat’l Bank of Cheyenne, 2008 WY 65, ¶ 9, 185 P.3d 679, 684–85 (Wyo. 2008) (“[The Wyoming
Supreme Court] give[s] great deference to a jury verdict: . . . it assumes ‘evidence in favor of the
successful party to be true, leaving out of consideration entirely the evidence in conflict . . . .’”)
(quoting Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 638 P.2d 1272, 1274–75 (Wyo.
1982)); Sanderson v. State, 2007 WY 127, ¶ 31, 165 P.3d 83, 92 (Wyo. 2007) (reviewing
constitutional questions de novo, but deferring to the jury’s guilty verdict and construing every
factual inference in the State’s favor).
56

See, e.g., Williams v. State, 290 S.W.3d 407, 412 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

E.g., Michael P. Seng & William K. Carroll, Eyewitness Testimony § 1:3 (2d ed. 2003);
Rebecca Brown & Steven Saloom, The Imperative of Eyewitness Identification Reform and the Role of
57
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factors interfere with a witness’s perception and memory, including improper
photographic or physical lineups without blind administrators, high stress, a
strong desire to choose correctly, subtle cues, and the limits of human memory.58
Human memory is not an exact record of factual events. Studies indicate that
we form memories through a “selective and a constructive process, in which
old elements fade and are lost while new elements—subsequent information or
suggestions—are unconsciously interwoven into the overall recollection until the
subject cannot distinguish one from the other.”59 This can cause witnesses to use
unconscious assumptions, stereotypes, and other thought patterns to fill in gaps
when constructing memories. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
describes the problem:
Many investigators believe that perception and memory are not
purely deductive, but have substantial inductive components.
Witnesses focus on gross or salient characteristics of any
sensory experience, and fill in the details, not according to
the observed facts of the experience, but according to some
previously internalized pattern they associate with the perceived
gross characteristics. In addition, the construction of memory
is greatly influenced by post-experience suggestion. Suggestions
compatible with the witness’ internalized stereotype are likely
to become part of the witness’ memory, not because they are
in fact similar to the actual experience, but because they fit the
preconceived stereotype.

Police Leadership, 42 U. Balt. L. Rev. 535, 539 (2013); Steven J. Frenda et al., Current Issues and
Advances in Misinformation in Research, 1 Current Directions in Psychol. Sci. 20, 20 (2011);
Ralph N. Haber & Lyn Haber, Experiencing, Remembering, and Reporting Events, 6 Psychol. Pub.
Pol’y & L. 1057, 1097 (2000); Elizabeth F. Loftus, Planting Misinformation in the Human Mind:
A 30-year Investigation of the Malleability of Memory, 12 Learning and Memory 361, 361–66
(2005); Steven Penrod, How Well are Witnesses and Police Performing?, 18 Crim. Just. 36, 37 (2003);
Matthew J. Sharps et al., Eyewitness Memory in Context: Toward a Taxonomy of Eyewitness Error, 24
J. Police Crim. Psychol. 36, 37 (2009)).
58
See generally Report of the Special Master: State v. Henderson, (June 18, 2011), available
at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/HENDERSON%20FINAL%20BRIEF%20.PDF%20
(00621142).pdf. See Thomas v. State, 784 P.2d 237, 241 (Wyo. 1989) (Urbigkit, J., specially con
curring) (“This court should not ignore the well-documented frequency of mistake which occurs in
eye-witness identification with regard for what should be appropriate in the tough cases.”) (citing
Annotation, Admissibility, at Criminal Prosecution, of Expert Testimony on Reliability of Eyewitness
Testimony, 46 A.L.R.4th 1047 (1986); Annotation, Necessity of, and Prejudicial Effect of Omitting,
Cautionary Instruction to Jury as to Reliability of, or Factors to be Considered in Evaluating, Eyewitness
Identification Testimony —State Cases, 23 A.L.R.4th 1089 (1983)); D. Duff McKee, Challenge to
Eyewitness Identification Through Expert Testimony, 35 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 1, § 1 (1996)
(“Eyewitness testimony may be the least reliable, and yet the most compelling.”).

E.g., People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 716 (Cal. 1984), overruled on other grounds by
People v. Mendoza, 4 P.3d 265 (Cal. 2000).
59
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Also, unreliability can be compounded by inaccurate
perception of even the gross characteristics of the experience.
Some studies have shown that even under ideal conditions,
height estimates by different witnesses can vary by more than
two feet. Even the estimates of experienced police officers can
vary by as much as five inches, and their weight and age estimates
can vary by as much as twenty pounds and fifteen years.60
A witness often becomes more certain of an identification over time. The
Timothy Cole case provides a tragic example of how this happens: during the
year before trial, as Michele Mallin repeatedly viewed images of Cole and received
positive feedback for her identifications, her initial doubts regarding Cole’s guilt
transformed into absolute certainty.61 Each confirmatory gesture, including police
artist sketches, pretrial identification, indictment, and the availability of other
corroborative evidence, strengthens the witness’s certainty. This kind of certainty
can provide a witness with an undue amount of credibility from a judge or
jury. The problem worsens in the context of statistically less reliable cross-racial
identifications,62 contributing to the already pervasive problem of racial bias in the
justice system.63 Standard tools for determining the truth of eyewitness testimony,
such as vigorous cross-examination or a jury’s observation of nonverbal cues, often
fail to uncover mistaken testimony.64
Unreliable pretrial identification procedures compound the problem. In
pretrial identification, a witness attempts to select a criminal suspect as the

United States v. Russell, 532 F.2d 1063, 1066 (6th Cir. 1976) (citing R. Buckhout,
Eyewitness Testimony, 231 Sci. Am. 23 –24 (1974); William Ringel, Identification and Police
Lineups 8–11 (1968); Patrick Wall, Eye-Witness Identification in Criminal Cases 10–11
(1965)) (internal citations omitted).
60

61

See supra notes 4–8 and accompanying text.

Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. Crim. L.
& Criminology 523, 546 –48 (2005); William J. Morgan, Jr., Justice in Foresight: the Past Problems
with Eyewitness Identification and Exoneration by DNA Technology, 3 S. Reg. Black L. Students
Assoc. L.J. 60, 69–72 (2009) (citing June E. Chance & Alvin G. Goldstein, The Other-Race
Effect and Eyewitness Identification 176 (1996); Peter Hills & Michael Lewis, Reducing the
Own-Race Bias in Face Recognition by Shifting Attention, 59 Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 996 (2006); Sherri
L. Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 934 (1984));
Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, The Other-Race Effect in Eyewitness Identification: What Do We
Do About It?, 7 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 230, 230 (2001).
62

Andrew E. Taslitz, Wrongly Accused: Is Race a Factor in Convicting the Innocent?, 4 Ohio St.
J. Crim. L. 121, 123 (2006); Arthur L. Rizer, III, Comment, The Race Effect on Wrongful Convictions,
29 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 845, 860 (2003); Louise Radnofsky, Compensating the Wrongfully Con
victed, Am. Prospect (July 24, 2007), http://prospect.org/article/compensating-wrongly-convicted.
63

64
See Report of the Special Master, supra note 58, at 48–50; Andrea Roth, Defying DNA:
Rethinking the Role of the Jury in an Age of Scientific Proof of Innocence, 93 B.U. L. Rev. 1643,
1654–56 (2013) (assessing empirical evidence challenging the ability of jurors to detect witness
credibility in light of DNA exonerations).
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perpetrator of a crime from a photographic array or in-person lineup. Juries give
substantial weight to this kind of testimony, possibly sealing the defendant’s fate.65
Even before trial, identifications can narrow a criminal investigation by eliminating
suspects and focusing law enforcement resources on particular theories of the
crime. This process often manifests itself in the destructive form of tunnel vision.
This occurs when a narrowing investigatory focus combines with systemic and
psychological characteristics of criminal justice institutions and witnesses, causing
police and prosecutors to invest undue resources in a particular theory, ignoring
alternative possibilities and conflicting evidence. The result is undue certainty
regarding the accuracy of eyewitness identification and a dangerous failure to
consider evidence contrary to the initial identification.66
Suggestive identification procedures can reduce the reliability of eyewitness
testimony. The Manson v. Brathwaite standard governs the admissibility of
eyewitness testimony based on pretrial identification procedures.67 This standard
assesses eyewitness reliability under the totality of the circumstances.68 A court
may consider several factors to determine whether an identification procedure
was “so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood
of irreparable misidentification.”69 For example, a suggestive lineup may involve
explicit or implicit cues regarding the “correct” selection, such as providing a
different photograph after the witness already selected the “wrong” person.70 But
suggestive identification procedures do not necessarily render an identification
unconstitutional. The court weighs suggestive factors against “the opportunity
of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree
of attention, the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, the level of
certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime
and the confrontation.”71 Nonetheless, improper identifications contribute to the
problem of tunnel vision.
Despite the substantial weight courts and juries give to eyewitness testimony,
highly reliable DNA testing evidence shows that such testimony plays a role in
Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is almost
nothing more convincing than a live human being who takes the stand, points a finger at the
defendant, and says ‘That’s the one!’”) (citations omitted); Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 120
(1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Russell, 532 F.2d at 1067; Gary L. Wells, Scientific Study of Witness
Memory: Implications for Public and Legal Policy, 1 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 726, 728 (1995).
65

See Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One’s Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision, 49 How.
L.J. 475, 479 (2006); Keith A. Findley & Michael Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision
in Criminal Cases, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 291, 292 (2006).
66

67

432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).

68

Id.

Russell, 532 F.2d at 1067 (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968)
(citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199–200 (1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
69

70

See id. at 1068.

71

Id. (citing Neil, 409 U.S. at 199).
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the majority of wrongful convictions.72 Many of these cases involved witnesses
who sincerely believed they saw the defendant, rather than cases of outright
perjury.73 Procedural rules governing the admissibility of eyewitness testimony,
including the restraints on improper pretrial identification procedures imposed by
Manson, failed to prevent a large number of wrongful convictions. This suggests
caution in continuing to place our faith in a jury’s ability to determine the accuracy
of eyewitness testimony, as well as the need for reforms to combat the causes
of misidentification.74

2. Forensic Science
Forensic science also contributes to undue faith in the reliability of criminal
convictions. These relatively new types of scientific evidence purport to use
procedures developed by the scientific method to connect a person to a crime.75
Before admission, evidence based on such methods should have a base level of
reliability demonstrated by experimental data.76 Yet juries often accord undue
reliability to scientific evidence and associated expert witness testimony, often
bordering on infallibility.77 Part of this problem stems from a reverse CSI Effect.
Jurors place inordinate trust in scientific evidence, in part, because of inaccurate
depictions in television and movies.78 Despite their claims to certainty, many

72
See State v. Delgado, 902 A.2d 888, 895 n.6 (N.J. 2006); State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d
582, 592 (Wis. 2005); Edward Connors et al., Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by Science:
Case Studies in the Use of DNA Evidence to Establish Innocence After Trial (Dept. of
Justice 1996); Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 55, 78–81 (2008);
Gross et al., supra note 62, at 542 –44; Causes and Remedies, The Innocence Project, http://www.
innocenceproject.org/fix/947/Causes-and-Remedies.php (last visited Apr. 28, 2014).
73
Gross et al., supra note 62, at 543 (noting that perjury is less common in wrongful rape
convictions than in wrongful murder convictions).
74
See generally, e.g., Valena Elizabeth Beety, What the Brain Saw: The Case of Trayvon Martin
and the Need for Eyewitness Identification Reform, 90 Denv. U. L. Rev. 331 (2012); Jules Epstein,
Irreparable Misidentification and Reliability: Reassessing the Threshold for Admissibility of Eyewitness
Identification, 58 Vill. L. Rev. 69 (2013); Brandon L. Garrett, Eyewitness and Exclusion, 65 Vand.
L. Rev. 451 (2012); Margery Malkin Koosed, Reforming Eyewitness Identification Law and Practices
to Protect the Innocent, 42 Creighton L. Rev. 595 (2009).
75
Craig M. Cooley, Reforming the Forensic Science Community to Avert the Ultimate Injustice,
15 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 381, 393–95 (2004).
76
The scientific method is a cyclical process of devising and revising hypotheses and using
experiments to test hypotheses for errors. Id. at 392.

Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Corp. v. Benfield, 140 F.3d 915, 920 (11th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 64 (D. Mass.1999); Craig M. Cooley, Forensic Science and Capital
Punishment Reform: An “Intellectually Honest” Assessment, 17 Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rts. L.J. 299,
365– 67 (2007) [hereinafter Cooley, Forensic Science]; Craig M. Cooley, The CSI Effect: Its Impact
and Potential Concerns, 41 New Eng. L. Rev. 471, 478 (2007) [hereinafter Cooley, CSI Effect].
77

Kimberlianne Podlas, “The CSI Effect”: Exposing the Media Myth, 16 Fordham Intell.
Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 429, 432–36 (2006). Named after the CBS crime drama CSI: Crime
Scene Investigation, the “CSI Effect” theory claims that media depictions of forensic science make
78
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forensic science methods are based on anecdotal information, rather than
experimental data.79 This allows invalid forensic science to play an important role
contributing to wrongful convictions.80 Even the admission of such testimony
into evidence can give jurors the perception of undue reliability.81 In contrast
to the morass of faulty science, DNA testing, while not infallible, continues to
provide one of the only reliable forms of forensic science—as demonstrated by
extensive proficiency testing.82

a. Development and Reliance on Scientific Evidence
Forensic science purports to provide accurate evidence by using techniques
developed through the scientific method.83 Ideally, these methods can demonstrate
a connection between a sample provided by a suspect (i.e., an exemplar) and
biological or other material bearing some relationship to a crime scene (i.e., a

prosecutions more difficult by creating unjustified expectations regarding the certainty of scientific
evidence. Id. Professor Podlas’s research found no empirical evidence of a CSI effect. Id. at 461; see
also Julie A. Singer et al., The Impact of DNA and Other Technology on the Criminal Justice System,
17 Alb. L.J. Sci. & Tech. 87, 115–16 (2007); Tom R. Tyler, Viewing CSI and the Threshold of
Guilt: Managing Truth and Justice in Reality and Fiction, 115 Yale L.J. 1050, 1056 (2006); see
also Robinson v. State, 84 A.3d 69, 75 (Md. Ct. App. 2014) (stating that evidence of the CSI
Effect is inconclusive). If anything, research suggests the possibility of a reverse CSI Effect, making
jurors more likely to render guilty verdicts based on the perceived infallibility of forensic science
evidence. Podlas, supra, at 461–62; Tyler, supra, at 1071. But see Donald E. Shelton et al., A Study of
Juror Expectations and Demands Concerning Scientific Evidence: Does the “CSI Effect” Exist?, 9 Vand.
J. Ent. & Tech. L. 331, 333 (2006) (finding that jurors expected the prosecution to provide
stronger forensic science evidence, but that these results were more related to general cultural
changes than television).
79
David L. Faigman, Anecdotal Forensics, Phrenology, and Other Abject Lessons from the History
of Science, 59 Hastings L.J. 979, 981–85 (2008) (describing anecdotal forensic science methods as
unfalsifiable pseudoscience).
80
E.g., House v. Bell, 386 F.3d 668, 708 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Merritt, J., dissenting)
(“High on the list of the causes for mistakes are the kinds of errors we see in this case: [including]
the misinterpretation or abuse of scientific evidence . . . .”), rev’d, 547 U.S. 518 (2006).

United States v. Hebshie, 754 F. Supp. 2d 89, 113 (D. Mass. 2010) (citing N.J. Schweitzer
& Michael J. Saks, The Gatekeeper Effect, 15 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 1, 12 (2009)).
81

Nat’l Research Council of the Nat’l Academies, Strengthening Forensic Science
United States: A Path Forward 99–101 (2009) [hereinafter NAS Report] (describing
challenges to the reliability of fingerprint evidence in the wake of the report issued by the National
Research Council of the National Academies).
82

in the

“The scientific method ‘is the persistent critique of arguments, in the light of tried canons
for judging the reliability of the procedures by which evidential data are obtained, and for assessing
the probative force of the evidence on which conclusions are based.’” Id. at 392 n.58 (quoting
Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation 13
(1961)). For detailed discussions of the development of the scientific method and its relationship
to the law of evidence, see David Goodstein, How Science Works, in Annotated Reference
Manual on Scientific Evidence 67–82 (Michael J. Saks et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005); Michael J. Saks,
Scientific Method: The Logic of Drawing Inferences from Empirical Evidence, in 1 Mod. Sci. Evidence
§§ 5:1–5:45 (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 2013).
83
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reference sample). For example, an expert witness may testify on the prosecution’s
behalf that a cotton fiber found on the shirt of a murder victim matches a shirt
owned by the defendant. This arguably increases the probability the defendant
and victim were in some kind of violent, physical contact, which can theoretically
increase the probability that the defendant assaulted the victim.84
Fingerprint evidence, developed during the early twentieth century, provides
the classic example of a well-accepted scientific identification method.85 It relies
on the theory that individuals have unique and permanent ridge patterns on the
fingers, palms, and soles, which leave latent outlines when touched to objects.86 A
forensic examiner attempts to match patterns left on objects connected with the
scene of a crime (e.g. a knife handle) to a suspect. While initially mistrusted,87 law
enforcement agencies and courts now put immense trust in fingerprint evidence.88
As with many other forms of forensic science, commentators now question the
reliability of fingerprinting89—although expert testimony based on fingerprint
evidence continues to remain largely admissible in U.S. courts.90
Since the advent of fingerprinting technology, scientists have developed
other new methods of forensic identification. For example, a firearms expert
may testify that bullets found at a crime scene match the defendant’s pistol.91 In
other examples, an expert may testify that the defendant’s blood,92 bite marks,93
This testimony would be based on the widely accepted Locard Exchange Principle. General
Assumptions and Rationale of Forensic Identification, in 4 Mod. Sci. Evidence, supra note 83, § 3
[hereinafter General Assumptions].
84

85

Id. § 30:51 (“Fingerprints are held up as the ultimate yardstick of uniqueness.”).

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fed. Bureau
Classification and Uses 170 (1985).
86

of

Investigation, The Science

of

Fingerprints:

87
Courts began finding that fingerprinting evidence was admissible and highly probative
during the first half of the twentieth century. Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint
Admissibility Rulings from Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1189
(2004) (citing People v. Jennings, 96 N.E. 1077, 1082 (Ill. 1911); Grice v. State, 151 S.W.2d 211,
217, 221 (Tex. Crim. App. 1941)).
88
E.g., United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 990 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Crisp,
324 F.3d 261, 268–69 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 572–73
(E.D. Pa. 2002).
89
See generally, e.g., Simon A. Cole, Fingerprinting: The First Junk Science?, 28 Okla. City
U. L. Rev. 23 (2003); Jacqueline McMurtrie, Swirls and Whorls: Litigating Post-Conviction Claims
of Fingerprint Misidentification after the NAS Report, 2010 Utah L. Rev. 267 (2010) (citing NAS
Report, supra note 82, at 42) (describing challenges to the reliability of fingerprint evidence in the
wake of the report issued by the National Research Council of the National Academies). But see
General Assumptions, supra note 84, § 30:51 (noting that fingerprint misidentifications are rare and
usually the result of human error).
90

See Baines, 573 F.3d at 990.

91

Cooley, supra note 75, at 439, 442, 443–44.

92

General Assumptions, supra note 84, § 30:46.

93

Cooley, supra note 75, at 437.
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footprints,94 handwriting,95 or hair96 match samples from the crime scene. Other
common forensic science methods analyze tool marks, bloodstain patterns, paint,
narcotics and other chemicals, fluids, fibers, glass, minerals, voiceprints, fire, and
explosives.97 Large numbers of expert witnesses stand ready to provide opinion
testimony based on these methods.98

b. Forensic Science in Question
Despite widespread expectations of reliability, scientists and advocates
strongly question many traditional forms of forensic science. According to a
comprehensive report by the National Research Council, courts often rely on
faulty science to identify criminal suspects.99 Prosecutors secure a large number
of erroneous convictions with evidence based on invalid forensic science.100 Many
of these errors surfaced due to the one type of forensic evidence that consistently
outperforms all others in terms of accuracy: DNA testing. Other errors are
uncovered through new experimental scrutiny of traditional forensic science
methods. For example, arson investigators frequently use untested theories to
persuade juries that burn patterns indicate the existence of an intentional fire.101
The State of Texas executed Cameron Todd Willingham in 2004 for having
murdered his children in a fire based largely on expert char pattern testimony.102
While the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles refused to grant Willingham a

94

Id. at 405.

See generally Jennifer L. Mnookin, Scripting Expertise: The History of Handwriting Identi
fication Evidence and the Judicial Construction of Reliability, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1723, 1725 (2001).
95

96

Cooley, supra note 75, at 405, 409–10, 412–13, 427, 435–36.

See NAS Report, supra note 82, at 127–82; General Assumptions, supra note 84,
§§ 30:46 –30:58.
97

98
See, e.g., The National Directory of Expert Witnesses: A Guide to Experts & Consultants in
Over 400 Fields & Specialties, Claims Providers of America, http://www.national-experts.com
(last visited May 7, 2014).
99
NAS Report, supra note 82, at 100. The U.S. Supreme Court appears to have recognized
the problem of faulty forensic science, resulting in renewed importance of cross-examination of
expert witnesses and protection of rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. Joëlle Anne Moreno, C.S.I. Bulls#!t: The National Academy of Sciences, Melendez-Diaz
v. Massachusetts, and Future Challenges to Forensic Science and Forensic Experts, 2010 Utah L. Rev.
327, 328–29 (2010) (citing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 309–10 (2009)).
100
See generally Brandon L. Garrett & Peter Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and
Wrongful Convictions, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1 (2009). See Garrett, supra note 72, at 81–86.
101
Cooley, supra note 75, at 431 n.309, 437–39; see also United States v. Hebshie, 754 F.
Supp. 2d 89 (D. Mass. 2010) (vacating arson and mail fraud conviction because defense counsel
was deficient in failing to object to faulty arson science testimony).
102

Debra Cassens Moss, DNA—The New Fingerprints, 74 A.B.A. J. 66 (May 1988).
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posthumous pardon,103 his guilt remains in significant doubt because of the
outdated arson science used to secure his conviction.104
Other wrongful convictions involve faulty testimony based on hair compari
son, bite mark, shoeprint, fingerprint, and voice analysis.105 Many forensic science
techniques and theories are based on folk lore or anecdotes, rather than rigorous
experimentation.106 Unfortunately, faulty forensic science disciplines continually
resist the process of error detection and falsification.107 Such resistance eviscerates
the unique predictive power provided by the scientific method.108
For many years before the widespread availability of DNA testing, blood
serology109 provided one of the most widely used methods for tying a suspect to
the scene of the crime. In blood serology, serum protein and red blood cell enzyme
typing are used to distinguish individuals as blood sample contributors.110 This
type of testing is useful in sexual assaults cases, which tend to involve suspects
leaving behind bodily fluids.111 These tests can narrow the class of individuals who
could have been the source of fluid evidence and, in some cases, exclude certain
people.112 For example, some people secrete their blood type into their bodily
fluids (so-called secretors), while others do not (non-secretors).113 If semen at a
crime scene exhibits a blood type, then a non-secretor suspect could not have been

John Schwartz, Texas: Posthumous Pardon is Denied for Man Executed in 3 Deaths, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 4, 2014, at A15.
103

104
Tex. Forensic Sci. Comm’n, Willingham/Willis Investigation (2011), http://www.
fsc.state.tx.us/documents/FINAL.pdf; Innocence Project Arson Review Comm., Report on
the Peer Review of the Expert Testimony in the Cases of State of Texas v. Cameron Todd
Willingham and State of Texas v. Ernest Ray Willis (2006), http://www.innocenceproject.org/
docs/ArsonReviewReport.pdf; Paul Bieber, A Burning Question, Champion, July 2013, at 34.
105

Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 100, at 47–75.

See Cooley, supra note 75, at 441 (discussing the problematic background of burn pattern
analysis); NAS Report, supra note 82, at 110, 188.
106

107

Cooley, supra note 75, at 393.

Id. at 393; United States v. Hebshie, 754 F. Supp. 2d 89, 125 (D. Mass. 2010) (citing
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993); Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses
and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin
Litigation, 86 Nw. U.L. Rev. 643, 645 (1992); Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The
Growth of Scientific Knowledge 37 (5th ed. 1989)).
108

Forensic serology involves determining and analyzing the type and features of blood for
trial purposes. Stevens, supra note 92; General Assumptions, supra note 84, § 30:46.
109

Thomas M. Fleming, Admissibility of DNA Identification Evidence, 84 A.L.R. 4th 313,
§ 2[e] (1991); General Assumptions, supra note 84, § 30:46.
110

111

General Assumptions, supra note 84, § 30:46.

112

Stevens, supra note 92.

See, e.g., People v. Goree, 349 N.W.2d 220, 224 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (affirming murder
conviction obtained through relevant and admissible expert testimony that defendant’s status as
non-secretor placed him within twelve percent of the population).
113
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the source. However, such testing is imprecise.114 While only a certain percentage
of the population may exhibit certain serological characteristics, that percentage
still includes a very large number of individuals, making the procedure far less
exact than DNA testing.115 Expert witnesses providing faulty testimony regarding
the exaggerated confirmatory power of blood serology testing compound the
problem.116 DNA testing often exonerates individuals convicted, at least in part,
through blood serology evidence and testimony, demonstrating the significant
potential risks of relying on faulty or outdated forensic science.117
Not all scientific disciplines are the same.118 Any credible approach to forensic
science should rely on rigorous experimental testing of its hypotheses.119 DNA
testing provides a superior model for assessing the credibility of forensic science.
It is practically alone among forensic science methods in providing objective and
reliable standards for matching individuals to biological material associated with
a crime scene.120 As explained in Section II.B, DNA testing (also known as DNA
fingerprinting) can connect an individual to a piece of biological material to near
certainty.121 While it is unreasonable to expect all fields to match the precision of
DNA testing, they should at least use the scientific method and experimental data
to determine their actual predictive power. Until other fields undertake serious
steps to match the rigor provided by DNA testing, our certainty in the accuracy
of many types of forensic science evidence remains in serious question.122

II. The DNA Testing Revolution
DNA testing disturbs longstanding assumptions regarding the criminal
justice system’s ability to use traditional forms of evidence and procedural rules
to determine guilt. Gold standards for determining guilt, including eyewitness
testimony, forensic science, and due process, failed to ferret out hundreds

114

General Assumptions, supra note 84, § 30:46; Garrett, supra note 72, at 81–82.

115

General Assumptions, supra note 84, § 30:46; Garrett, supra note 72, at 81–82.

General Assumptions, supra note 84, § 30:46 (“Secretor status testing was one area in
particular where laboratories performed poorly and which led to improper determinations of
common origin.”); Garrett, supra note 72, at 82.
116

117

See generally Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 100.

118

NAS Report, supra note 82, at 182.

119

Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 100, at 392.

120
NAS Report, supra note 82, at 7–8, 42 (“With the exception of nuclear DNA analysis,
however, no forensic method has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and
with a high degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence and a specific individual
or source.”).
121

See infra notes 150–56 and accompanying text.

122

NAS Report, supra note 82, at 7–8, 42.
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(and perhaps more) of wrongfully convicted individuals.123 We would remain
unaware of the extent of the problem if not for the “divine intervention”124 of
DNA testing, which can exclude a defendant to such an unprecedented degree
of certainty that it can singlehandedly invalidate mountains of traditionally
persuasive evidence of guilt.125 Part A explains what DNA is.126 Part B discusses
the discovery and technological development of DNA fingerprinting.127 Part C
discusses the admissibility of DNA testing evidence and related expert witness
testimony at trial.128 Finally, Part D discusses the criminal justice applications of
DNA testing.129

A. What is DNA?
In the nineteenth century, an Austrian monk named Gregor Mendel discovered
genetic inheritance. He did so by observing how hybridized pea plants inherited
dominant and recessive traits.130 This discovery led to the theory that individuals
receive certain traits from parents in the form of packages called genes.131 In 1944,
scientists discovered the connection between genes and nucleic acids located
within the nucleus of an organism’s cells.132 Nucleic acids (adenine, thymine,
guanine, and cytosine) form nucleotide base pairs along a sugar phosphate
backbone in a double spiral structure—called a double helix.133 This material,
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), provides instructions for the functioning and
development of living organisms.134 Certain sets of nucleotide base pairs, ranging

123
E.g., Innocence Project Case Profiles, The Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.
org/know/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2014).
124
James S. Liebman, The New Death Penalty Debate: What’s DNA Got to Do with It?, 33
Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 527, 543– 49 (2002).
125

Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 Minn. L. Rev. 1629, 1647 (2008).

126

See infra notes 130–37 and accompanying text.

127

See infra notes 138 – 61 and accompanying text.

128

See infra notes 162–81 and accompanying text.

129

See infra notes 182–91 and accompanying text.

130

John M. Butler, Fundamentals of Forensic DNA Typing 34 (2010).

Each Organism’s Traits Are Inherited from a Parent through Transmission of DNA, Scitable
(2014) http://www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/each-organism-s-traits-are-inheritedfrom-6524917.
131

132
Genetics and Genomics Timeline, Genome News Network (2004), http://www.genome
newsnetwork.org/resources/timeline/1944_Avery.php.
133
David H. Kaye & George Sensabaugh, DNA Typing, in 4 Mod. Sci. Evidence, supra note
83, § 31:39 (“The physical structure of DNA is often described as a double helix because the
molecule has two spiraling strands connected to each other by weak bonds between the nucleotide bases.”).

J. Watson & F. Crick, Molecular Structure of Nucleic Acids, 171 Sci. 737 (1953); U.S. Nat’l
Libr. of Med., Nat’l Instit. of Health, What is DNA? (Apr. 28, 2014), http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/
handbook/basics/dna.
134
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from 1,000 to 10,000 base pairs (called genes), provide instructions for cellular
activity, such as the production of enzymes.135 Most human DNA is organized into
very long DNA structures containing thousands of genes called chromosomes.136
When a cell divides, the cell’s chromosomes are duplicated, which allows DNA to
replicate itself.137

B. Technological Development of DNA Fingerprinting
The vast majority of DNA is identical between humans,138 making it useless
for distinguishing between different people. But scientists have discovered
individually unique regions.139 Initially considered useless, these sequences of
so-called “junk DNA” appear in repeated patterns that are individual to each
person—other than identical twins, who share identical DNA.140 In 1985, Sir Alec
Jeffreys, a United Kingdom geneticist determined these unique repeating patterns
could be used as a kind of “genetic fingerprint” to identify specific individuals.141
These sequences can match or exclude a person from having contributed a piece
of biological evidence or determine a person’s biological heritage.142
At the risk of simplifying technical procedures, DNA testing proceeds in
roughly the following manner:


First, a reference sample is obtained from a known individual.
This may be obtained voluntarily or under court order from
the person or from a profile previously incorporated into a law
enforcement database like the Combined DNA Index System
(CODIS). The sample is often a cheek swab (such as a buccal
swab), but can also be blood, semen, skin, or hair. As long as the
technician extracts a sufficient amount of quality DNA from
the sample, the testing can proceed without problems, regardless

135

Kaye & Sensabaugh, supra note 133, § 31:39.

136

Id.

Bruce Alberts et al., Molecular Biology of the Cell ch. 5 (4th ed. 2002), available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK26850/.
137

138
Peter Donnelly & Richard D. Friedman, DNA Database Searches and the Legal Consump
tion of Scientific Evidence, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 931, 939– 40 (1999).
139
David N. Cooper et al., An Estimate of Unique DNA Sequence Heterozygosity in the Human
Genome, 69 Human Genetics 201 (1985).

Thomas Curran, Parliamentary Research Branch, BP-443E, Forensic DNA Analysis:
Technology and Application 6 (1997), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/research
publications/bp443-e.pdf.
140

141
Rana Saad, Discovery, Development, and Current Applications of DNA Identity Testing, Baylor
U. Med. Ctr. Proceedings (Apr. 2005), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1200713/.

A. Jeffreys et al., Hypervariable “Ministatellite” Regions in Human DNA, 314 Nature
67 (1985).
142
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of the source material.143 A technician then extracts a DNA
fingerprint from the sample (often after using a technique to
amplify or replicate the sample), producing a DNA profile (a
sample genotype) through one of a number of techniques.144


Second, the process is repeated with a piece of biological evidence
connected to a crime. This is often biological material left at the
scene of the crime, such as semen in a sexual assault kit.145



Finally, the technician compares the genotypes of the two
samples to determine if there is a genetic match. If there is a
match, the technician determines the likelihood ratio, which is
the probability, based on relevant population databases, that a
random person could have created the match. This creates an
objective probability that a given person was the source of a
specific piece of biological evidence to an extremely high degree
of confidence.146

While the above steps describe a common, simplified approach to testing,
there is no single “DNA test.” Over time, genetic scientists developed increasingly
sophisticated and accurate methods of comparing DNA samples, which can
provide more accurate results for smaller and more degraded samples. The first
dominant form of DNA testing was Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism
(RFLP).147 This form of testing was precise but time-consuming and required
a large sample of biological material in relatively good condition.148 Scientists
later developed the Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) amplification technique,
which uses an enzyme called polymerase to duplicate and amplify a sample.149
This makes it substantially easier to test smaller or more degraded samples—a
method very helpful for testing old pieces of biological evidence, such as semen
on a shirt that has been sitting in an evidence locker since the 1980s.
Kaye & Sensabaugh, supra note 133, § 31:46 (noting the large variety of sources susceptible to DNA testing, including old blood stains, bite marks, urine, and cigarette butts).
143

144
Nat’l Instit. of Justice, DNA Evidence: Basics of Analyzing (Aug. 9, 2012), http://nij.gov/
topics/forensics/evidence/dna/basics/Pages/analyzing.aspx.
145

Id.

146

Id.

Charles I. Lugosi, Punishing the Factually Innocent: DNA, Habeas Corpus, and Justice, 12
Geo. Mason U. C.R. L.J. 233, 243–44 (2002); Holly Schaffer, Note, Postconviction DNA Evidence:
A 500 Pound Gorilla in State Courts, 50 Drake L. Rev. 695 (2002) (citing Nat’l Inst. of Justice,
The Future of Forensic DNA Testing: Predictions of the Research and Development
Working Group 14 (2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/dna/pubs.htm).
147

148

General Assumptions, supra note 84, § 30:46; Lugosi, supra note 147, at 244–45.

Lugosi, supra note 147, at 246–47 (citing Randi B. Weiss et al., The Use of Genetic Testing
in the Courtroom, 34 Wake Forest L. Rev. 889, 898–99 (1999)); Nat’l Inst. of Justice, supra note
147, at 17.
149
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Most contemporary testing involves Short Tandem Repeats (STR) testing.150
STR testing applies PCR analysis to short repeating regions of DNA, called
loci.151 It is very sensitive and can generate conclusive results from smaller,
degraded samples.152 A combination of all thirteen STR loci produces a frequency
of about 1 in 575 million Caucasians and 1 in 900 trillion African Americans.153
In other words, there is a 1 in 575 million chance that a random Caucasian person
would have produced a positive result from the test. STR testing is the primary
method used in the FBI’s CODIS database.154 Another common method, Y-STR
testing, is a variation on STR testing that isolates repeating sections on the Y
chromosome, found only in males.155 Y-STR testing is useful for analyzing male
samples contaminated with female samples, typical in sexual assault cases.156
Other DNA testing methods exist for specialized situations. Low-Copy
Number (LCN) typing is used for very small samples.157 Single-Nucleotide
Polymorphism (SNP)158 testing is used for samples subjected to extreme
environmental degradation, such as samples recovered from the World Trade
Center attacks.159 Finally, mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) analysis, unlike all of
the above methods, analyzes a special kind of DNA contained in the organelles

150
Lugosi, supra note 147, at 246; Nat’l Inst. of Justice, supra note 147, at 1; John M.
Butler, Genetics and Genomics of Core Short Tandem Repeat Loci Used in Human Identity Testing, 51
J. Forensic Sci. 253 (2006).
151

Saad, supra note 141.

152

Butler, supra note 150, at 261.

Richard Saferstein, Criminalistics, in DNA: The Indispensable Forensic Science Tool
(9th ed. 2004).
153

154
Nat’l Inst. of Justice, supra note 147; Butler, supra note 150, at 253; see also Nat’l Inst.
Standards and Tech., FBI Core STR Loci (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.cstl.nist.gov/biotech/
strbase/fbicore.htm.

of

155

Butler, supra note 150, at 261.

156

Id.

Bruce Budowle et al., Validity of Low Copy Number Typing and Applications to Forensic
Science, 50 Croatian Med. J. 207 (2009), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC2702736/.
157

Peter Gill, An Assessment of the Utility of Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNPs) for
Forensic Purposes, 114 Int’l J. Legal Med. 204 (2001), available at http://link.springer.com/
article/10.1007/s004149900117#page-1.
158

Leslie G. Biesecker et al., Enhanced: DNA Identifications After the 9/11 World Trade
Center Attack, 310 Sci. 1122 (2005); Nanci Ritter, Identifying Remains: Lessons Learned From
9/11, 256 Nat’l Inst. Just. J. (Jan. 2007), available at http://www.nij.gov/journals/256/Pages/
lessons-learned.aspx; U.S. Dept. of Justice, Lessons Learned from 9/11: DNA Identification
in Mass Fatality Incidents 7, 18 (2006), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/214781.
pdf. As of 2011, 1,722 of the 8,157 bone fragments requiring DNA testing in the World Trade
Center wreckage were linked to known individuals. Russell Goldman, World Trade Center:
1,630th Victim Identified Since 9/11, ABC News (May 12, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/US/
world-trade-center-1630th-victim-identified-911/story?id=13591639.
159
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outside the cell’s nucleus.160 While time consuming, costly, and less precise than
other methods, mtDNA testing may be useful for analyzing highly degraded
samples in which nuclear DNA has not been preserved, such as in bones, teeth,
and hair shafts.161 While STR testing is conducted more often than other methods,
the precise method will depend on the nature of evidence in question.

C. Evidentiary Development
The admissibility of DNA evidence depends on the typical standards for
admitting scientific evidence. Most jurisdictions, including Wyoming, adopt
some version of Federal Rule of Evidence 702.162 According to that Rule,
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to
the facts of the case.163
If these elements exist, an expert with specialized knowledge can provide opinion
testimony to the finder of fact (usually a jury) regarding DNA testing results.164
When determining the admissibility of scientific evidence, U.S. courts view the
judge as a gatekeeper who determines not whether an expert witness’s conclusions
are valid, but whether the expert used sufficiently sound general principles,
160
Mark R. Wilson et al., Validation of Mitochondrial DNA Sequencing for Forensic Casework
Analysis, 108 Int’l J. Legal Med. 68 (1995).
161

Norah Rudin & Keith Inman, Forensic DNA Analysis 59 (2d ed. 2002).

162

See Fed. R. Evid. 702; Wyo. R. Evid. 702.

163
Fed. R. Evid. 702; accord Wyo. R. Evid. 702 (“If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”).

Some DNA testing statutes expressly require that a motion for testing specify a method
of testing that uses a scientific method of sufficient reliance and materiality to be admissible under
applicable evidentiary rules. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-12-303(c)(vi) (2013).
164
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reasoning, and methodology to allow a jury to hear the testimony.165 Most U.S.
courts use the U.S. Supreme Court’s Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.166 test to determine the admissibility of scientific evidence. The Daubert
Court held that the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded the former “general
acceptance” standard for admissibility of scientific evidence167 and announced
four non-exclusive factors of reliability determining Rule 702 admissibility: “a
theory’s testability, whether it ‘has been a subject of peer review or publication,’
the ‘known or potential rate of error,’ and the ‘degree of acceptance . . . within
the relevant scientific community.’”168 Not all factors will be relevant or weighed
in the same manner for all types of evidence. The court must determine how
to apply the factors based on their relevance to a particular type of evidence.169
Other possible factors may include: “(1) The experience and specialized expertise
of the proffered expert; (2) Whether or not that expert is testifying about matters
occurring “naturally and directly” out of research conducted independent of
litigation; and (3) Any “non-judicial” utilization of the expert methodology
in question.”170
Despite the fact-intensive nature of admissibility questions, courts widely
consider current DNA testing methods admissible.171 The first and third Daubert
factors, in particular, strongly support the general admissibility of DNA evidence.
This is largely due to the significant amount of proficiency testing and extremely
accurate likelihood ratios provided by DNA testing results.172
Of course, DNA evidence is not infallible.173 As argued above, the public’s
illusions regarding the certainty of any forensic scientific method can result in
165
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993); Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999).
166

509 U.S. 579; see also Fed. R. Evid. 702 cmt. notes on 2000 amendment.

See, e.g., Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see also Springfield v.
State, 860 P.2d 435, 442 (Wyo. 1993) (adopting the Daubert rule and rejecting the Frye general
acceptance test).
167

Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 145 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589–95); accord Easum v.
Miller, 2004 WY 73, 92 P.3d 794 (Wyo. 2004) (applying Daubert’s non-exclusive factors).
168

169

See, e.g., Bunting v. Jamieson, 984 P.2d 467, 475 (Wyo. 1999).

170

Id. at 472.

E.g., United States v. Ewell, 252 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D.N.J. 2003); see also Springfield, 860
P.2d at 447–48 (holding that the reliability and weight of DNA evidence is a question for the jury
and that testimony regarding the statistical probability of a random DNA match is an appropriate
and perhaps necessary component of expert witness testimony regarding DNA testing results);
Revera v. State, 840 P.2d 933 (Wyo. 1992) (applying Rule 702 and holding RFLP test results
were admissible).
171

172

General Assumptions, supra note 84, § 30:46; Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 117.

Cooley, CSI Effect, supra note 77, at 478–80 (citing Adam Liptak, You Think DNA is
Foolproof ? Try Again, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 2003, at 5; William C. Thompson et al., How the
Probability of a False Positive Affects the Value of DNA Evidence, 48 J. Forensic Sci. 48 (2003))
(describing several instances of DNA testing errors and miscalculations).
173
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wrongful convictions.174 The primary problems regarding the admissibility of
DNA evidence tend to involve testing that fails to adhere to applicable field
standards175 and the risk that lawyers, courts, and jurors misunderstand the
results.176 Like any scientific technique, DNA methods must remain subject
to criticism and extensive error testing.177 Laboratories must adhere to quality
assurance standards178 and qualified expert witnesses must correctly explain the
results to jurors.179 Several crime laboratories have been involved in high profile
scandals regarding inadequate training and procedures used in DNA and other
forms of forensic testing.180 But if properly conducted and explained, DNA testing
continues to provide the most consistently reliable form of forensic science.181 That
is why it has played such an important role in spurring the innocence movement
and the exoneration of hundreds of prisoners.

174

See supra notes 99–122 and accompanying text.

The National Research Council has issued three reports regarding standards for DNA
testing and other types of forensic science. Some courts view the second report as an authoritative
statement regarding the standards for the field of DNA testing. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 602
F. Supp. 2d 658 (D. Md. 2009).
175

See Harry Edwards, Solving the Problems that Plague the Forensic Science Community, 50
Jurimetrics 5 (2009); Dale A. Nance & Scott B. Morris, Juror Understanding of DNA Evidence:
An Empirical Assessment of Presentation Formats for Trace Evidence with a Relatively Small RandomMatch Probability, 34 J. Legal Stud. 395, 419–23 (2005); William C. Thompson & Edward
L. Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical Evidence in Criminal Trials: The Prosecutor’s Fallacy and
the Defense Attorneys’ Fallacy, 11 Law & Hum. Behav. 167 (1987). For an example of an appeal
from trial proceedings involving the misunderstanding of DNA testing principles, see McDaniel v.
Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 128 (2010) (reversing on largely procedural grounds).
176

177
Cooley, Forensic Science, supra note 77, at 363– 64 (“If a purported scientific field, such
as forensic science, claims its techniques (i.e., fingerprinting, DNA analysis) or professionals (i.e.,
fingerprint examiners, DNA analysts) are infallible, then this field is not comprised of scientists
and it is not practicing science. If no errors are being committed or detected, there is no growth,
and thus no science.”) (citing Max Hirschberg, Wrongful Convictions, 13 Rocky Mtn. L. Rev. 20,
34 (1940)).
178
Nat’l Res. Council, The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence 75–88, 179–80
(1996); Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science: The Need to Regulate Crime
Labs, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 163, 213–19 (2007); Kaye & Sensabaugh, supra note 133, § 31:47.
179

Nat’l Res. Council, supra note 178, at 169–71; Edwards, supra note 176.

David L. Faigman et al., Current Objections to DNA Admissibility—Preservation of Evidence,
in 4 Mod. Sci. Evidence, supra note 83, § 31:15. For example, a 2013 report demonstrated
improper training at the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment, throwing several
convictions based on blood alcohol testing into doubt. Letter from John W. Suthers, Colo. Att’y
Gen., to Tom Raynes, Exec. Dir., Colo. Dist. Att’y’s Council et al. (June 7, 2013), available at http://
www.krdo.com/blob/view/-/20503056/data/2/-/ qsnx10/-/CDPHE-investigation-report.pdf.
180

181

NAS Report, supra note 82, at 99–101.
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D. Criminal Justice Applications of DNA Testing and the Birth of the
Innocence Movement
Initially, criminal lawyers used DNA testing at trial to establish or exclude an
individual from having a connection to a crime.182 If a person leaves biological
evidence at the scene, STR and other methods of DNA testing can provide
highly accurate means of either determining the probability that defendant left
the evidence or entirely excluding that person.183 Law enforcement agencies, in
particular, have sought to use DNA testing as part of criminal investigations. The
FBI maintains a database of DNA profiles—mostly STR profiles of convicted
offenders—called CODIS,184 which includes contributions by all fifty state
governments, each having its own DNA database.185
DNA testing’s truly revolutionary application arrived not as trial evidence,
but when innocence advocates began using it to collaterally challenge prison
sentences. This is often done years or decades after the initial jury verdict. Barry
Scheck and Peter Neufeld, former public defenders, founded the Innocence Project
at Cardozo Law School in 1992.186 They organized the Project as a student clinic
primarily focused on using post-conviction DNA testing to collaterally attack
the convictions of factually innocent persons.187 The Innocence Project laid the
groundwork for a nationwide Innocence Network.188 Innocence Network member
organizations now operate in every U.S. jurisdiction.189 Member organizations
work with law students and lawyers to secure the release of factually innocent

182
Mark Hansen, The Great Detective, 87 A.B.A. J. 36, 36 –43 (2001); U.S. Dept. of Justice,
Nat’l Comm’n on the Future of DNA Evidence, Postconviction DNA Testing: Recommenda
tions for Handling Requests 2 (1999), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/177626.pdf.
183
Alan L. Friedman, Forensic DNA Profiling in the 21st Century, 43 Int’l J. Offender
Therapy & Comp. Criminology 1, 168 (1999).
184
Violent Offender DNA Identification Act of 1999, DNA Backlog Elimination Act and
Convicted Offender DNA Index System Support Act: Hearing on H.R. 2810, H.R. 3087, and H.R.
3375, Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 89 (2000)
(statement of Dwight E. Adams), available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/the-fbis-codisprogram; CODIS and NDIS Fact Sheet, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-analysis/
codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (last visited Apr. 28, 2014); see also 42 U.S.C. § 14131(a) (2012)
(authorizing creation of CODIS).

Dept. of Justice, Audit Report: The Combined DNA Index System i (Sept. 2001),
http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/FBI/a0126/final.pdf. For an example of a statute authorizing a
state database, see Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-19-402 (2013).
185

186

Barry Scheck et al., Freeing the Innocent, Champion, Mar. 2000, at 18.

Id. at 22; Barry C. Scheck, Barry Scheck Lectures on Wrongful Convictions, 54 Drake L. Rev.
597, 597–98 (2006).
187

188
Barry Scheck & Peter Neufeld, Building an Innocence Network and an Innocence Agenda,
Champion, Mar. 2000, at 23–33.

See Innocence Network Member Organizations (2012), http://www.innocencenetwork.
org/members (last visited Apr. 28, 2014).
189
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prisoners—whether through DNA or other newly discovered evidence—and
to lobby state legislatures to adopt measures to prevent and correct wrongful
convictions, as well as compensate the wrongfully convicted.190 As of late 2013,
at least 311 individuals were exonerated through some form of post-conviction
collateral relief.191 In that year, the Network’s member organizations assisted in
the exoneration of thirty-one prisoners.192 These exonerations helped expose the
falsity of many of our illusions of certainty in the criminal justice system’s results,
potentially paving the way for broader reforms.

III. The Evolution of Post-conviction Relief
This section explains the historical development of post-conviction remedies
to protect the rights of factually innocent defendants and prisoners. Part A briefly
addresses the standard safeguards provided by trial and direct appellate review.193
Part B looks at the development of collateral remedies, including freestanding
constitutional challenges to a person’s continued incarceration.194 Finally, Part C
discusses the evolution of statutes providing post-conviction innocence claims
based on newly performed DNA testing.195

A. Trial and Direct Appeal
The U.S. justice system provides several safeguards to prevent wrongful
convictions. Commentators hail these measures for providing “unparalleled
protections against convicting the innocent.”196 Many of these safeguards emerged
from the U.S. Supreme Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren, providing multiple
assurances that criminal defendants are presumed innocent and may not have
their liberty interests infringed upon without due process of law.197 Ideally, these
190
See At
28, 2014).

the

Innocence Network, http://www.innocencenetwork.org (last visited Apr.

191
Exonerated: Cases by the Numbers, CNN (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/04/
justice/prisoner-exonerations-facts-innocence-project/.
192
Innocence Network Exonerations 2013 (2014), http://www.innocencenetwork.org/
innocence-network-exoneration-report-2013.
193

See infra notes 198–210 and accompanying text.

194

See infra notes 211–75 and accompanying text.

195

See infra notes 276–91 and accompanying text.

Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 420 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring). Commentators
have attempted to use statistics to obscure the rate of wrongful convictions, painting the
exonerations as aberrations of a system that nearly always gets the correct result. See Kansas v.
Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 197–98 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Joshua Marquis, the Innocent
and the Shammed, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 2006, at A23) (“[E]ven with its distorted concept of what
constitutes ‘exoneration,’ the claims of the Gross article are fairly modest: . . . . ‘That would make
the error rate .027 percent—or, to put it another way, a success rate of 99.973 percent.’”). But see
Risinger, supra note 13, at 771 n.17 (criticizing this approach).
196

197

Herrera, 506 U.S. at 398–99 (majority opinion).
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protections, combined with the zealous (or, at least, not ineffective) advocacy and
proffering of evidence by adversarial lawyers, should allow a neutral jury of one’s
peers to correctly determine whether the state met its burden of proving guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.
For example, the U.S. Constitution’s Due Process Clause protects a person
from conviction of a crime unless the prosecution proves every element of an
offense beyond a reasonable doubt.198 Due process requires several guarantees,
including the right to a speedy trial before an impartial jury, and other protections
recognized by courts over time.199 These standards apply to the U.S. federal
government through the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and
largely to state governments through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.200 The Constitution even guarantees the right to a directed verdict of
acquittal if “no rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”201
After conviction, all U.S. jurisdictions, including the federal government, provide
some form of direct appellate review.
The procedural safeguards provided by trial and direct appeals frequently
fail to uncover erroneous convictions.202 These unparalleled protections failed to
stop the imprisonment of hundreds, if not more, of innocent people.203 Belief
in the power of due process is a cruel illusion for hundreds of factually innocent
individuals who served prison terms or were executed, but later exonerated by
DNA evidence.204 Legal scholars have done considerable work documenting the
198

See U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV.

See id.; Herrera, 506 U.S. at 398–99. These protections include the presumption of
innocence, the state’s burden to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, confrontation of adverse
witnesses, compulsory process, effective assistance of counsel, jury trials, prosecution disclosure of
exculpatory evidence, and fair trials before fair tribunals. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 398–99.
199

200
See U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; see also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74
(1979) (incorporating sixth amendment right to counsel in non-felony cases with potential for
imprisonment); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969) (incorporating double jeopardy
protection); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (incorporating jury trial right);
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) (incorporating right to present witnesses); Klopfer v.
North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 226 (1967) (incorporating right to speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400, 407– 08 (1965) (incorporating confrontation clause rights); Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1, 3 (1964) (incorporating right to remain silent); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961)
(incorporating exclusionary rule); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 278 (1947) (incorporating right to
public trial).
201

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317 (1979).

Richard A. Rosen, Innocence and Death, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 61, 68–69 (2003); Roth,
supra note 64, at 1646– 47 (noting the rarity of directed verdicts of acquittal and reversals due to
insufficient evidence); Risinger, supra note 13, at 762.
202

203

Exonerated: Cases by the Numbers, supra note 191.

Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably Acquit the
Innocent?, 49 Rutgers L. Rev. 1317, 1370–71 (1997); Rosen, supra note 202, at 67–68; Richard
A. Rosen, Reflections on Innocence, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 237, 243–44 (2006).
204
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causes of wrongful convictions, including compelling prosecution narratives,
institutional norms, resource imbalances, and the tendency for constituents of
the legal system to fall prey to tunnel vision.205 Introduction of faulty eyewitness
testimony and forensic science evidence can worsen the problem of an adversarial
system that is not dedicated to the discovery of truth, scientific 206 or otherwise.
The standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt arguably guarantees not a
defendant’s factual guilt, but merely a jury’s reasonable and actual belief in
guilt.207 Despite their important role in the U.S. legal system, substantial evidence
indicates that juries may be ill equipped to adequately determine questions of
factual guilt, particularly when trials depend on problematic eyewitness or
scientific testimony.208
Appellate review, with its focus on the search for procedural error and
substantial deference to juries as finders of fact, appears uniquely ill suited for
reviewing factual claims of innocence.209 Studies demonstrate the frequent inability
of factually innocent individuals—who are later exonerated through some form of
collateral attack—to use the appellate process to secure new trials.210 While DNA
evidence may provide near certainty of a prisoner’s factual innocence, appellate
courts lack the procedures and purpose to use that evidence to provide effective
factual review.
Evidence of limitations in the trial and appellate processes suggests the need
for some form of post-conviction review. This review allows individuals who have
fallen through the gaps provided by traditional procedural remedies to use newly
discovered evidence to collaterally attack their convictions. Otherwise, factually
innocent individuals who lacked access to material, exculpatory evidence at trial
may have no way to challenge their imprisonment. The next part discusses the
major approaches for collaterally challenging wrongful convictions.

205
Keith A. Findley, Innocents at Risk: Adversary Imbalance, Forensic Science, and the Search
for Truth, 38 Seton Hall L. Rev. 893, 894–97 (2008) (tunnel vision, doctrinal disparities, and
forensic science evidence); Findley & Scott, supra note 66, at 343–46 (tunnel vision); Garrett, supra
note 72, at 60–61 (appeals process); Dianne L. Martin, Lessons About Justice from the “Laboratory” of
Wrongful Convictions: Tunnel Vision, the Construction of Guilt and Informer Evidence, 70 UMKC L.
Rev. 847, 847–49 (2002); Rosen, supra note 202, at 75–78 (standard appellate and post-conviction
remedies); Rosen, supra note 204, at 242–44 (procedural protections).
206

NAS Report, supra note 82, at 110.

207

Roth, supra note 64, at 1647.

208

Id. at 1654–56.

Rosen, supra note 202, at 75–76 (citing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 402 (1993);
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 307 (1979); People v. Bolden, 58 P.3d 931, 955 (Cal. 2002); H.
Richard Uviller, The Processes of Criminal Justice: Adjudication 1264 (2d ed. 1979)).
209

210

Garrett, supra note 72, at 60; Garrett, supra note 125, at 1670–71.
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B. Collateral Remedies
After an appellate court issues a mandate affirming a criminal conviction,
some form of collateral attack is necessary to challenge a conviction on the grounds
of newly discovered evidence demonstrating actual innocence.211 These measures
are extraordinary in nature, largely due to the substantial respect given to jury
verdicts and policy interests in securing finality.212 After a jury renders a guilty
verdict, the convicted person no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence.213 He
or she therefore bears a heavy burden of displacing a presumptively correct result.

1. Traditional Approach to Post-conviction Relief
Historically, individuals convicted of crimes had little practical recourse to
challenge their convictions, other than through the standard appellate process.
Prior to codification of modern procedural rules, courts had authority to grant
relief from a judgment—if requested within the same term as the judgment in
question—through “a bewildering variety of writs and equitable remedies, ‘shrouded
in ancient lore and mystery.’”214 While post-conviction statutes and court rules
211
A “collateral” attack refers to an indirect challenge to a proceeding other than a
direct appeal:

An attack on a judgment in a proceeding other than a direct appeal; esp.,
an attempt to undermine a judgment through a judicial proceeding in which the
ground of the proceeding—or a defense in the proceeding—is that the judgment is
ineffective. Typically a collateral attack is made against a point of procedure or another
matter not necessarily apparent in the record, as opposed to a direct attack on the
merits exclusively.
Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009); accord Wall v. Kholi, 131 S. Ct. 1278, 1282 (2011)
(defining “collateral review” as used in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) as judicial review of a proceeding
apart from direct review).
212
See, e.g., Dist. Att’y’s Office for Third Jud. Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 72 –73 (2009)
(“The elected governments of the States are actively confronting the challenges DNA technology
poses to our criminal justice systems and our traditional notions of finality, as well as the opportunities
it affords.”); id. at 76 –77 (Alito, J., concurring) (“We also have long recognized the need to impose
sharp limits on state prisoners’ efforts to bypass state courts with their discovery requests. For
example, we have held that ‘concerns of finality, comity, judicial economy, and channeling the
resolution of claims into the most appropriate forum’ require a state prisoner to show ‘cause-andprejudice’ before asking a federal habeas court to hold an evidentiary hearing.”) (quoting Keeney v.
Tamayo–Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 8 (1992)) (citations omitted)). For a discussion of the policy value of
finality in criminal trials, see Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441 (1963).

Herrera, 506 U.S. at 399 (“Once a defendant has been afforded a fair trial and convicted of
the offense for which he was charged, the presumption of innocence disappears.”); see also Wainright
v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977) (describing the perception of the outcome of a criminal trial “as a
decisive and portentous event”).
213

214
11 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil Procedure
§ 2851 (West 3d ed. 2013) (citing Zimmern v. United States, 298 U.S. 167, 169–70 (1936) (quoting
Report of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the
United States, 5 F.R.D. 433, 479 (1946))).
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largely supplanted common law writs, courts retain the ability to use common law
remedies to fill the gaps in post-conviction law.215 For example, depending on the
jurisdiction, writs of habeas corpus,216 coram nobis, and audita querela continue to
provide opportunities for collateral relief from criminal convictions.217
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 and its state counterparts allow a
court to “vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so
requires.”218 If a defendant requests a new trial on grounds of newly acquired
evidence—which is often the case in collateral attacks premised on a defendant’s
actual innocence—he or she must file the motion within strict time limits.219
For example, the federal rules require a movant to bring the motion within three
years after the verdict or finding of guilt.220 Wyoming’s rule provides an even
stricter standard, requiring a movant to make a motion before or within two years
after final judgment.221 While phrased in various manners by different courts, a
motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence is granted only if the
defendant shows:
(1) the evidence was discovered after trial; (2) the failure to learn
of the evidence was not caused by lack of diligence; (3) the new
evidence is not merely impeaching or cumulative; (4) the new
evidence is material to the principal issues involved; and (5) the
new evidence would probably produce an acquittal if a new trial
were granted.222
Courts have substantial discretion in reviewing such motions,223 often viewing
them with disfavor and granting them only with “great caution.”224 To be sure,
the deadlines imposed by Rule 33 are not jurisdictional; courts have discretion
to extend them in response to excusable neglect.225 Yet courts rarely grant such
215

See United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 510–11 (1954).

216

See infra notes 231–75 and accompanying text.

217

See generally Brian R. Means, Postconviction Remedies §§ 1.1–5.11 (West 2013).

Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a); accord Wyo. R. Crim. P. 33(a) (“The court on motion of a defendant
may grant a new trial to that defendant if required in the interest of justice.”).
218

219

See Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(b)(1); Wyo. R. Crim. P. 33(c).

220

Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(b)(1).

221

Wyo. R. Crim. P. 33(c).

Id.; accord Hopkinson v. State, 769 P.2d 1008 (Wyo. 1984); Opie v. State, 422 P.2d 84, 85
(Wyo. 1967) (citing United States v. Johnson, 142 F.2d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 1944)); David DeFoore,
Postconviction DNA Testing: A Cry for Justice from the Wrongly Convicted, 33 Tex. Tech L. Rev.
491, 502–14 (2002).
222

223

See, e.g., Opie, 422 P.2d at 85.

224

E.g., United States v. Hill, 737 F.3d 683, 687 (10th Cir. 2013).

Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 advisory committee’s notes; United States v. Munoz, 605 F.3d 359,
367 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Boesen, 499 F.3d 874, 879 (8th Cir. 2010). For the factors
considered in determining whether the deadline should be extended for excusable neglect, see
Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs., 407 U.S. 380 (1993).
225
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relief.226 Instead, courts tend to view new trials as extraordinary relief, which,
unchecked, would “open the floodgates” for prisoners seeking to relitigate their
convictions.227 This approach gives great weight to the policy goals of finality,
procedural consistency, and efficiency.228 But it provides little recourse to factually
innocent prisoners convicted with evidence later determined faulty or superseded
by far more precise methods. Before states adopted contemporary new trial
statutes,229 many prisoners eventually exonerated through DNA testing statutes
had substantial difficulty contesting their convictions based on traditional new
trial motions.230 The available procedural norms simply did not account for the
arrival of new evidence providing the overwhelming materiality and accuracy of
DNA testing.

2. Constitutional Relief, Habeas Corpus, and the Search for a
Freestanding Innocence Claim
Freestanding constitutional claims provide one way to collaterally challenge
a criminal conviction after the period for requesting a new trial has passed. These
claims argue that continuing to incarcerate a person proven factually innocent
violates that person’s constitutional rights.231 This approach involves asking a
court to grant a writ of habeas corpus. Prior to the adoption of post-conviction
statutes, habeas corpus provided the primary method for mounting collateral
challenges that would be time barred under Rule 33.232 Yet the U.S. Supreme
Court has significantly narrowed the viability of these claims.233

226

Rosen, supra note 202, at 484–85.

See, e.g., Dowdell v. State, 854 So. 2d 1195, 1202 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002) (Shaw,
J., concurring) (describing the competing interests of finality and justice); State v. Hatton, No
00CA10, 2000 WL 1152236, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2000).
227

See, e.g., Paul J. Mishkin, Foreward: The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process
of Time and Law, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 56, 79–80 (1965) (“Even the broadest view of the [habeas
corpus] writ’s functions would not deny that a proper sentence of a competent court imposed after
an unquestionably fair trial is an acceptable justification for continued imprisonment; the mere
possibility, however real, that a new trial might produce a different result is not a sufficient basis
for habeas corpus. Considerations of substance require at least this much finality even for criminal
proceedings resulting in imprisonment. The functions of collateral attack must thus be focused on
relieving from confinements whose basis is deficient in more fundamental ways.”); Frontline: The
Case for Innocence, Interview with Judge Sharon Keller (PBS Jan. 11, 2000), http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/case/interviews/keller.html (“We can’t give new trials to everyone who
establishes, after conviction, that they might be innocent. We would have no finality in the criminal
justice system, and finality is important.”).
228

229

See infra notes 276–91 and accompanying text.

230

Garrett, supra note 125, at 1671–72.

See generally Robert J. Smith, Recalibrating Constitutional Innocence Protection, 87 Wash. L.
Rev. 139 (2012); Jordan Steiker, Innocence and Federal Habeas, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 303, 380–88 (1993).
231

232

See infra notes 239–46 and accompanying text.

233

See infra notes 244–72 and accompanying text.
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In the early seventeenth century, English common law judges created the
writ of habeas corpus.234 Originally a tool used by the monarch to ensure proper
administration of prisoners, courts began using the writ to exercise supervisory
control over the sovereign’s authority to imprison its citizens.235 This allowed
English courts to enforce the Magna Carta’s requirement that no free person “be
arrested or imprisoned . . . except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by
the law of the land.”236 The framers of the U.S. Constitution, cognizant of this
tradition, feared the abusive selective suspension of the writ over certain territories and people.237 The United States therefore inherited the writ, along with
other English common law principles, as a means of challenging a prisoner’s
physical confinement.238
Despite murky origins and a variable history,239 the writ of habeas corpus
remains a fixture of U.S. law. It provides relief to a person imprisoned in violation
of the U.S. Constitution.240 Habeas claims are available to state prisoners
demonstrating a violation of the U.S. Constitution, federal law, or a treaty.241
Federal prisoners can challenge their incarceration on similar grounds using postconviction statutory procedures that give effect to habeas relief.242 These claims
can be based on a large number of (often-procedural) pre-conviction guarantees
of due process recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court as extending from the U.S.
Constitution’s Due Process Clause.243

234

Paul Delaney Halliday, Habeas Corpus: From England to Empire 9 (2010).

Id. at 9–11, 15 (citing Ralph V. Turner, Magna Carta Through the Ages 231 (2003));
see also D. Meador, Habeas Corpus and Magna Carta 74–75 (1966); Theodore Plucknett, A
Concise History of the Common Law 57–58 (5th ed. 2010).
235

Halliday, supra note 234, at 15 (quoting Magna Carta art. 39 (1215), reprinted in
Turner, supra note 235, at 231 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
236

I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 337–38 (2001); see also U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion
or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”).
237

238

Means, supra note 217, § 4:2.

For more information regarding the evolution of the writ of habeas corpus in the United
States, see Means, supra note 217, §§ 4:1–4:9.
239

240

Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993).

E.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(1), 2254(a) (2012); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991);
State ex rel. Holm v. Tahash, 139 N.W.2d 161, 163–64 (Minn. 1965) (citing Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1962); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963))
(“[These decisions’] unmistakable effect is to make available to any state prisoner a procedure in
the Federal courts by which he may collaterally attack a final judgment of conviction by a state
court, including those affirmed following appellate review.”). But see Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. 72 (1977) (holding that violations of state substantive law do not provide a basis for habeas
corpus relief ).
241

242

28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012).

Herrera, 506 U.S. at 398–99. The Herrera Court provided a detailed list of rights stemming
from a criminal defendant’s right to due process, including:
243
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This raises the issue of whether the U.S. Constitution or federal law provides
a freestanding claim to habeas relief premised solely on a prisoner’s factual
innocence. The U.S. Supreme Court struggled with the issue for years, providing
seemingly conflicting answers while never expressly stating that proof of factual
innocence creates a constitutional right to habeas relief.244 For example, in
Herrera v. Collins, the Court held that habeas corpus provides relief to factually
innocent prisoners only to the extent that their imprisonment resulted from an
independent constitutional violation.245 This is because, according to the Court,
habeas corpus exists to remedy constitutional violations, not simply errors of fact,
even if newly discovered evidence reveals factual errors resulting in incarceration
of an innocent person.246
The U.S. Supreme Court had another opportunity to address the issue in its
2009 decision, District Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial District v. Osborne.247
Osborne stemmed from a brutal 1993 sexual assault in Anchorage, Alaska.248 The
State of Alaska prosecuted two men for the crime based on several pieces of evidence,
including semen found inside a condom subject to relatively inexact DQ Alpha

A person when first charged with a crime is entitled to a presumption of
innocence, and may insist that his guilt be established beyond a reasonable doubt.
Other constitutional provisions also have the effect of ensuring against the risk of
convicting an innocent person. . . . right to confront adverse witnesses[,] . . . right to
compulsory process[,] . . . right to effective assistance of counsel[,] . . . prosecution
must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt[,] . . . right to jury trial[,] . . . prosecution
must disclose exculpatory evidence[,] . . . right to assistance of counsel[, and] . . .
right to “fair trial in a fair tribunal”. In capital cases, we have required additional
protections because of the nature of the penalty at stake.
Id. (internal citations omitted) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Coy v. Iowa, 487
U.S. 1012 (1988); Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); Beck v.
Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980)).
See Dist. Att’y’s Office for Third Jud. Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 71 (2009) (“Whether
such a federal right [to release upon proof of actual innocence] exists is an open question. We have
struggled with it over the years, in some cases assuming, arguendo, that it exists while also noting
the difficult questions such a right would pose and the high standard any claimant would have
to meet.”).
244

245

506 U.S. at 400.

See id.; Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Discretion and Post-Conviction
Evidence of Innocence, 6 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 467, 483 (2009) (discussing the lack of a constitu
tional claim for release due to factual innocence, regardless of the weight of the evidence, without a
showing of procedural error).
246

247

557 U.S. 52.

248

Id. at 57.
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DNA testing.249 A jury found Osborne guilty of kidnapping, assault, and sexual
assault.250 After a series of failed collateral challenges to his conviction,251 Osborne
requested relatively more precise RFLP 252 testing under Alaska’s post-conviction
statute.253 The state appellate court denied that request twice.254 First, the court
determined that (1) the statute did not provide access to testing if the testing was
available at trial and (2) there was no federal constitutional right to obtain DNA
testing of biological evidence.255 Second, after remand, the court determined that
Osborne had no constitutional right to testing, largely due to the weight of evidence
against him, including a confession on a parole application and the potential
inconclusiveness of RFLP testing.256 Finally, Osborne filed claims in federal court
requesting STR DNA testing 257 based on violations of his constitutional rights
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.258 After an initial dismissal by the district court and
remand from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the district court
determined that a limited constitutional right to DNA testing existed “under the
unique and specific fact presented,” and granted summary judgment in Osborne’s
favor.259 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, extending
the prosecutor’s pre-trial duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to post-conviction
proceedings and holding that failure to test the evidence created a cognizable
§ 1983 claim for violation of rights guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.260
The U.S. Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to determine whether
Osborne had a viable § 1983 claim and whether he had a due process right to
post-conviction DNA testing of the state’s biological evidence. The Court held

249
Id. DQ Alpha testing “can clear some wrongly accused individuals, but generally cannot
narrow the perpetrator down to less than 5% of the population.” Id. (citing Dept. of Justice,
Nat’l Comm’n on the Future of DNA Evidence, The Future of Forensic DNA Testing
17 (2000); Dept. of Justice, Nat’l Comm’n on the Future of DNA Evidence, Postconviction DNA Testing: Recommendations for Handling Requests 27 (1999) [hereinafter
DOJ Recommendations]).
250

Id. at 58.

Osborne first sought relief because his lawyer’s failure to request RFLP testing at trial
amounted to constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. (citing Osborne v. State, 110 P.3d
986, 990 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005)). He lost that appeal largely because his lawyer’s decision to not
seek testing, based on her belief in her client’s guilt, was deemed strategic, rather than ineffective.
Id. (citing Osborne, 110 P.3d at 991–92).
251

252

For more information about RFLP testing, see supra notes 138–61 and accompanying text.

253

Osborne, 557 U.S. at 59; see also Alaska Stat. §§ 12.72.010–12.72.040 (2014).

254

Osborne, 557 U.S. at 59 (citing Osborne, 110 P.3d at 992–93).

255

Id. (citing Osborne, 110 P.3d at 992–93).

256

Id. (citing Osborne v. State, 163 P.3d 973, 979–81 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007)).

257

For more information about STR testing, see supra notes 138–61 and accompanying text.

258

Osborne, 557 U.S. at 60.

259

Id. at 60.

260

Id. at 61 (citing Osborne v. State, 521 F.3d 1118, 1128, 1130–31 (9th Cir. 2008)).
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that Osborne had no such right and reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.261 The Court’s reasoning emphasized the role of states in providing
post-conviction remedies and criticized what it viewed as an impermissible call for
federal courts to “constitutionalize” the issue by subjecting it to the requirements
of the Due Process Clause.262 While the Court recognized Osborne’s liberty
interest in obtaining DNA testing, it held that his conviction greatly diminished
that interest, justifying greater flexibility on the part of the state to offer postconviction procedures.263 To invalidate those procedures, Osborne was required
to show they “‘offend[] some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,’ or ‘transgress[] any
recognized principle of fundamental fairness in operation.’”264 The Court held
that Osborne failed to do so.265 The Court stopped short of deciding the issue of
whether Osborne had a federal constitutional right to be released through a writ
of habeas corpus on a claim of actual innocence.266 Finally, the Court held that
Osborne had no substantive due process right to obtain DNA testing.267 In fact,
the Court acknowledged the trend of state legislation allowing prisoners to bring
claims for post-conviction DNA testing and expressed its discomfort meddling
with such policy questions by creating substantive constitutional testing rights.268
While the question of whether a freestanding constitutional claim for
habeas relief resulting from a prisoner’s factual innocence remains unsettled,
prior decisions created substantial barriers to obtaining such relief. The U.S.
Supreme Court appears to use a largely procedural approach to habeas corpus
claims, providing relief not necessarily to those who are factually innocent, but
to those who suffered some kind of procedural error.269 This is consistent with
a broader post-conviction focus by federal courts, dating at least to the Warren
Court, on process, rather than substance, as the primary grounds for granting
relief to the judgment of a trial court.270 This approach places little emphasis on
261

Id. at 61–62.

262

Id. at 55–56.

263

Id. at 68 – 69.

264

Id. at 69 (quoting Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 446, 448 (1992)).

265

Id. at 69–70.

266

Id. at 71–72.

267

Id. at 72.

268

Id. at 73–74.

Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 246, at 483 (citing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390
(1993); Moeller v. Weber, 689 N.W.2d 1, 7 (S.D. 2004); Bruce v. Smith, 553 S.E.2d 808 (Ga.
2001)). But see Herrera, 506 U.S. at 419 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[E]xecuting the innocent is
inconsistent with the Constitution. Regardless of the verbal formula employed . . . the execution of
a legally and factually innocent person would be a constitutionally intolerable event.”).
269

Rosen, supra note 204, at 242– 44; see also Garrett, supra note 125, at 1631–32 (noting
courts’ unwillingness to intervene to enable freestanding constitutional innocence claims and the
flurry of state legislative activity authorizing collateral challenges using newly discovered evidence).
270
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whether punishment has been imposed (1) on a person who deserves it and (2) in
a manner furthering the interests of society. What matters is not so much whether
the person should actually be punished, but whether the proper procedures were
used to justify the punishment. As discussed in Section I, this approach may
conflict with some of our retributive and utilitarian beliefs grounding the moral
legitimacy of punishment.271
The future of a freestanding constitutional right to DNA testing of biological
evidence in the state’s possession remains unclear.272 Challenges to post-conviction
remedy statutes in the wake of Osborne have not been particularly successful.273
Procedural due process will play an important role in determining a prisoner’s
right to DNA testing, as well as remedying independent constitutional violations.
But successful collateral attacks on procedurally “correct,” yet factually wrongful,
convictions based on new evidence will likely depend on state post-conviction
statutes.274 As explained below, these statutes expose illusions of undue certainty
regarding the accuracy of criminal verdicts by identifying the factual causes of
wrongful convictions.275

C. Post-conviction DNA Testing and New Trial Statutes
Uncertainty regarding the availability of a freestanding constitutional right
to post-conviction DNA testing encourages innocence advocates to focus their
efforts on state legislatures,276 which may prove more amenable to lobbying efforts

271

See supra notes 26 – 48 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, DNA and Due Process, 78 Fordham L. Rev. 2919, 2920–21
(2010) (arguing that many appellate courts and commentators have misinterpreted Osborne and
that it recognizes a procedural due process right that should pressure state legislatures to provide
post-conviction remedies); Christian Van Buskirk, Note, Guilty until Proven Innocent: Clearing
Massachusetts’s Uncertain Road to Post-Conviction DNA Testing, 85 St. John’s L. Rev. 1595, 1596–97
(2011); The Supreme Court 2008 Term—Leading Cases, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 222, 232 (2009).
272

See Alvarez v. Att’y Gen. for Fla., 679 F.3d 1257, 1262– 65 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing
Osborne’s holding that there is no freestanding right to post-conviction DNA testing, that petitioner
did not show that Florida’s procedures were facially unconstitutional, and that the district court
lacked jurisdiction to consider petitioner’s as-applied challenge because it would require a lower
federal court to review a state court judgment in violation of the Feldman–Rooker doctrine) (citing
Dist. of Colum. Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263
U.S. 413 (1923)).
273

See Dist. Att’y’s Office for Third Jud. Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 55–56, 68–69 (2009)
(noting state flexibility in crafting post-conviction remedies); cf. DeLoge v. State, 2010 WY 60,
¶ 29–30, 231 P.3d 862, 868 (Wyo. 2010) (citing Osborne and holding that defendant lacked a
constitutional right to the return of biological evidence from Mississippi law enforcement).
274

275

See infra notes 292–545 and accompanying text.

See Osborne, 557 U.S. at 55–56 (characterizing post-conviction relief as an issue for state
legislatures to address).
276
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than the U.S. Supreme Court. Before Osborne, state legislatures started adopting
statutes permitting collateral challenges to convictions based on newly discovered
DNA evidence, even after the traditional time limits imposed by variations of
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 have expired.277 New York adopted the
first statute providing an avenue to request post-conviction DNA testing before
requesting a new trial.278 Illinois adopted a somewhat different statute four years
later.279 While individual statutes exhibit substantial variation, they tend to use
language adapted from the New York or Illinois statutes.280 Under the New York
approach, a court may grant a motion for post-conviction DNA testing if the state
possesses biological evidence and testing’s availability at trial would have created
a “reasonable probability” of a more favorable verdict.281 Illinois’s statute permits
a court to order post-conviction DNA testing if a movant makes a prima facie
showing that (1) the evidence was unavailable at trial, (2) identity was in issue
at trial, (3) the evidence exists and has a sufficient chain of custody, (4) testing
“has the scientific potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence materially
relevant to the defendant’s assertion of actual innocence,” and (5) the testing uses
a generally accepted scientific method.282
The Innocence Project urges state legislatures to base their statutes on its
model legislation.283 According to the Project, an effective statute should provide
a reasonable standard for obtaining post-conviction testing.284 States should
make testing available in all cases in which it could establish factual innocence,
regardless of whether the defendant was released from prison, convicted of a
noncapital offense, or pled guilty or confessed.285 Statutes should not provide
fixed dates when testing availability will expire. 286 Defendants should be able to
obtain an evidentiary hearing to argue the materiality and accuracy of the evidence

277

Id.

278

N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 440.30(1-a) (McKinney 2014) (effective Aug. 2. 1994).

279

725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/116-3 (West 2014) (effective Jan. 1, 1998).

See Validity, Construction, and Application of State Statutes and Rules Governing Requests for
Postconviction DNA Testing, 72 A.L.R. 6th 227 (2012) [hereinafter State Statutes]; Daina Borteck,
Note, Pleas for DNA Testing: Why Lawmakers Should Amend State Post-Conviction DNA Testing
Statutes to Apply to Prisoners Who Pled Guilty, 25 Cardozo L. Rev. 1429, 1453 (2004); Karen
Christian, Note, “And the DNA Shall Set You Free”: Issues Surrounding Postconviction DNA Evidence
and the Pursuit of Innocence, 62 Ohio St. L.J. 1195, 1201 n.20 (2001).
280

281

N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 440.30 (McKinney 2014).

282

725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/116-3 (West 2014).

Innocence Project, Model Legislation (Oct. 2012), http://www.innocenceproject.org/
docs/model/Access_to_Post_Conviction_DNA_Testing_Model_Bill.pdf.
283

Access to Post-Conviction DNA Testing, The Innocence Project, http://www.innocence
project.org/Content/Access_To_PostConviction_DNA_Testing.php (last visited Apr. 28, 2014).
284

285

Id.

286

Id.
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and testing method, and to appeal adverse decisions to an appellate court.287
Finally, statutes should create measures to protect evidence from destruction as
long as a defendant is imprisoned or otherwise experiences adverse effects of
the conviction.288
As of 2014, the vast majority of U.S. states, in addition to the U.S. federal
government, the District of Columbia, and some U.S. territories, have adopted
statutes authorizing motions for DNA testing as a prelude to a motion for a new
trial.289 While variations between each state’s statutes are beyond the scope of
this article, certain features can improve a statute’s effectiveness in identifying
unjustified certainty in the legal system and the causes of wrongful convictions.
For example, a statute may unnecessarily restrict post-conviction testing to
individuals convicted of capital crimes,290 overlooking the lengthy prison terms
and social stigma resulting from noncapital convictions, such as sexual assault.
This article discusses these features in the context of Wyoming’s statute below.291

287

Id.

288

Id.

Post-Conviction Relief Through DNA Testing, 0030 50 State Statutory Surveys: Criminal
Laws: Criminal Procedure 21 (Thomson Reuters/West 2012); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3600 (2012);
Ala. Code § 15-18-200 (2012); Alaska Stat. §§ 12.72.010(4), 12.72.020(b)(2) (2013); Ariz.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4240 (2010); Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-202 (2012); Cal. Penal Code
§ 1405 (West 2012); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-413 (2013); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-582 (2013); Del.
Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4504 (2012); D.C. Code §§ 22-4133 to 22-4135 (2012); Fla. Stat. § 25.11
(2013); Ga. Code Ann. § 5-5-41 (2013); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 844D-123 (2013); Idaho Code Ann.
§ 19-4902 (2012); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/116-3 (2012); Ind. Code § 35-38-7-5 (2013); Iowa
Code § 81.10 (2013); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-2512 (2013); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 422.285 (West
2012); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 926.1 (2013); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 2137 (2012);
Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 8-201 (West 2013); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278A (2012); Mich.
Comp. Laws § 770.16 (2013); Minn. Stat. § 590.01 (2013); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-9 (2013);
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 547.035 (2013); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-110 (2013); Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 29-4120 (2013); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 176.0918 (2013); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 651-D:2 (2013);
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A-32a (West 2013); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-1a-2 (2013); N.Y. Crim. Proc.
Law § 440.30(1-a) (2012); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-269 (2013); N.D. Cent. Code § 29-32.1-15
(2012); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 953.72 (West 2013); Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.690 (2012); 42 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 9543.1 (2013); R.I. Gen. Laws § 10-9.1-11 (2013); S.C. Code Ann. § 17-28-30
(2012); S.D. Codified Laws § 23-5B-1 (2013); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-304 (2012); Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 64.01–64.05 (West 2013); Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-9-300-304 (West
2013); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 5561 (2013); Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-327.1 (2013); Wash. Rev.
Code § 10.73.170 (2013); W. Va. Code § 15-2B-14 (2013); Wis. Stat. § 974.07 (2013); Wyo.
Stat. Ann. § 7-12-303 (2013); Dist. Att’y’s Office for Third Jud. Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52,
73–74 (2009); Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 246, at 484 (describing statutory trends).
289

Oklahoma appears to be alone in not providing a modern post-conviction DNA testing
statute. State Statutes, supra note 280, § 2. The Massachusetts General Court passed a bill providing
post-conviction access to scientific analysis, which became effective on May 17, 2012. See S.B.
1987, 187th Gen. Ct., 2012 2d Ann. Sess. (Mass. 2012).
290

See Ala. Code § 15-18-200 (2012); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 422.285 (West 2012).

291

See infra notes 389–497 and accompanying text.
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IV. What Wyoming Can Learn from Innocence
Post-conviction access to DNA testing provides vital relief to wrongfully
convicted individuals and their families and friends. Few can comprehend the
staggering pain and loss that accompany spending years or even decades of one’s
life wrongfully incarcerated.292 Unlike a rescinded contract, there is no status
quo ante to which an exoneree can return.293 An exoneree can never regain the
years of wrongful imprisonment. But the prisoner’s foregone loss does not justify
refusing to mitigate the effects of wrongful incarceration. Although we can
never make exonerees whole, we can still work to release them from prison and
provide financial compensation and other services as important, if incomplete,
reparative gestures. The moral dignity and valuable years of freedom following
exoneration independently justify the work performed by Innocence Network
member organizations, friends and family of the accused, lawyers, law students,
journalists, activists, courts, legislatures, and law enforcement to fight wrongful
convictions.294 Each exoneree’s claim to freedom has intrinsic worth; yet the
hundreds of exonerations are also a symptom of underlying problems with how
we determine guilt and punishment. As important as innocence work is, we
should look beyond individual cases to get a better sense of why the system
convicts so many innocent people and what legal changes can prevent the problem
in the future.
This section suggests some ways to address those questions. Part A examines
why innocence claims, even when supported by powerful DNA evidence, can
create intense anxiety, resistance, and denial.295 Part B examines the innocence
event, in which DNA testing and exonerations may force us to question many
of our false assumptions about the efficacy and legitimacy of our current model
of criminal justice.296 Part C looks at Wyoming’s approach to post-conviction
relief, its benefits, and problems.297 This discussion includes an examination of the
limits of post-conviction DNA testing and the need for broader structural reform
to address the lurking problem of wrongfully convicted prisoners whose cases do
not involve DNA evidence.298 Finally, Part D discusses the questionable future
292
See Exonerees, The Hous. Chron., http://www.chron.com/exonerees/ (last visited Apr. 28,
2014); Michael Hall, The Exonerated, Tex. Monthly (Nov. 2, 2008), http://www.texasmonthly.
com/story/exonerated.

See generally Innocence Project, Making up for Lost Time: What the Wrongfully
Convicted Endure and How to Provide Fair Compensation (2009), http://www.innocence
project.org/docs/Innocence_Project_Compensation_Report.pdf.
293

This is not to understate the substantial difficulties faced by exonerees after release from
prison. See infra notes 474–91 and accompanying text.
294

295

See infra notes 304–38 and accompanying text.

296

See infra notes 348– 87 and accompanying text.

297

See infra notes 389–516 and accompanying text.

298

See infra notes 499–516 and accompanying text.
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of reforms to address wrongful convictions following the Wyoming Legislature’s
2014 Budget Session.299

A. Coping with the Anxiety of Wrongful Convictions
Faith in the legal system’s ability to justly prosecute and punish criminals
provides one method of coping with the anxiety of living in an uncertain,
dangerous world. The notion that we could be victims of a violent crime is
frightening. No one wants to be gunned down by a neighboring farmer who takes
the law into his own hands over a dispute regarding boundary lines of contiguous
tracts of land.300 While we can protect ourselves with security systems, self-defense
classes, and firearms, it is impossible to account for every contingency. At some
point, most of us have to leave our doomsday bunkers and attend to our personal
and business affairs, letting our guard down against the outside world. According
to social contract theory,301 we agree to accept the intrusion of state sovereignty
in our personal lives, often in the form of a constitution, in exchange for the
promise that the state will protect us from crime.302 The fearsome power of the
state receives legitimacy because it appears superior to the constant war of all
against all characterized by life in the Hobbesian “state of nature.”303 Authoritarian
state punishment comforts us by promising to punish the guilty and protect the
innocent, easing our terror of illegitimate violence by private actors and helping
to stave off thoughts of our own mortality.304
Recognizing the legal system’s substantial problem with failing to stop
wrongful convictions can create cognitive dissonance for people who spent their
lives revering that system as the height of human justice. That, in turn, can give
way to anxiety if we feel a kind of traumatic helplessness resulting from the
dangerous situation posed by the legal system’s failure to protect us from each
other or the system itself.305 From a modern medical perspective, anxiety is an
299

See infra notes 517– 44 and accompanying text.

See Jones v. Commonwealth, 216 S.W. 607 (Ky. Ct. App. 1919) (“Watch old Joe Eggers
run. If one law don’t work, I will make me a law of my own that will work.”) (quoting defendant)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
300

For a discussion of references to social contract theory in U.S. case law, see Anita L. Allen,
Social Contract Theory in American Case Law, 51 Fla. L. Rev. 1 (1999).
301

See James Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan, in 7 The
Collected Works of James M. Buchanan (2000) (1975).
302

303
Thomas Hobbes contrasted life under mutual submission to public authority against
the anarchic state of nature. Sharon A. Lloyd, Hobbes’s Moral and Political Philosophy, Stan.
Encyclopedia of Phil. (Feb. 25, 2014), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hobbes-moral/.

See Donald P. Judges, Scared to Death: Capital Punishment as Authoritarian Terror
Management, 33 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 155, 164–73 (1999) (analyzing support for capital punishment
as an unconscious defense against fear of mortality).
304

For a brief discussion of Freud’s development of the notion of anxiety and later alterations
of the concept, see Dylan Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis
10–12 (2006).
305
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emotional state marked by tension, worrying, and physical symptoms, such as
raised blood pressure.306 It has its roots in the work of Sigmund Freud, who posited
anxiety not as fear regarding a particular object, but as a free-floating sensation of
fear and expectation, marked by tight breath and ready to attach itself to specific
content.307 Our current anxiety involves not only the fear that the legal system
will be unable to protect us from violent crime, but also the unbearable fear that
the system itself will suffocate us.308 The very thing that once comforted us and
protected us from the “nasty, brutish, and short” life in the state of nature 309
changes in a manner difficult to describe with words, like a loving parent who
momentarily transforms into a deranged abuser.310 This experience is profoundly
unpleasant, giving rise to different strategies for coping with the trauma, such as
repression and denial.311
We can better understand why challenging our illusions can be so difficult
by taking a trip to the movies. Billy Wilder’s classic film Sunset Boulevard depicts
a woman, Norma Desmond, who cannot cope with the idea that her years as a
celebrated silent movie star have long since passed.312 Forgotten by Hollywood,
she spends the late years of her life pursuing the illusion that she remains a famous
actor. A small cadre of enablers, including her ex-husband butler (Max) and a
young screenwriter (Gillis), help her to cover up the gaps and maintain the fantasy
that she is preparing for a role in a Cecil B. DeMille picture.
Gillis eventually learns that DeMille called the mansion to borrow Norma’s
car for the movie, not to offer her a role. He then tries to expose the lie:
Gillis: The audience left twenty years ago. Now face it.
Norma: That’s a lie! They still want me!
Gillis: No, they don’t.
Norma: What about the studio? What about De Mille?
Gillis: He was trying to spare your feelings. The studio wanted
to rent your car.
306

Anxiety, Am. Psychol. Assoc., http://www.apa.org/topics/anxiety/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2014).

Sigmund Freud, A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis 346 (G.S. Hall trans., 14th
ed. 1925).
307

308
Evans, supra note 305 at 12 (“All desire arises from lack, and anxiety arises when this lack is
itself lacking; anxiety is the lack of a lack. Anxiety is not the absence of the breast, but its enveloping
presence; it is the possibility of its absence which is, in fact, that which saves us from anxiety.”).
309

Buchanan, supra note 302.

310

Evans, supra note 305, at 12.

311

Id. at 11.

312

Sunset Boulevard (Paramount Pictures 1950).
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Norma: Wanted what?
Gillis: De Mille didn’t have the heart to tell you. None of us has
had the heart.
Norma: That’s a lie! They want me, they want me! I get letters
every day!
Gillis: You tell her, Max. Come on, do her that favor. Tell her
there isn’t going to be any picture—there aren’t any fan letters,
except the ones you write yourself.
Norma: That isn’t true! Max?
Max: Madame is the greatest star of them all.
Norma cannot cope with this information. She predicated her identity on
the idea that she is a movie star. Rather than face reality, she lashes out at the
messenger who seeks to destroy her fantasy, murdering the young screenwriter
and leaving him face down in the swimming pool. Even the arrival of police fails
to disturb her delusion. Max says “Action!” and Norma walks down the grand
staircase towards the news cameras, famously declaring, “All right, Mr. DeMille,
I’m ready for my close-up.”
Wilder’s film demonstrates an important truth regarding how difficult, even
threatening, it can be to challenge illusory beliefs. This is particularly true when
we use those beliefs to structure our ideas about the identity and value of ourselves
and the people around us. Norma attached her self-worth to the idea, built up
over decades, that she is a famous movie star. She pursues the delusion of her
starring role, discounting evidence to the contrary. When confronted by someone
who is unafraid to tell her the truth, she experiences a complete break from reality.
To maintain the fantasy, she must scapegoat and destroy the intruder who seeks to
expose it.
Similarly, the comfort provided by the criminal justice system can make
it difficult to challenge the idea that we punish only the guilty. While some
commentators expressly defend sacrificing a “small” number of innocent people
as the necessary price of having a criminal justice system that keeps us safe,313 it

313
Professor Risinger describes this as the “Paleyite” justification, named after William Paley,
who remarked, “[H]e who falls by a mistaken sentence, may be considered as having fallen for his
country, whilst he suffers under the operation of those rules, by the general effect and tendency
of which the welfare of the community is maintained and upholden.” Risinger, supra note 13, at
763–64 & n.3 (quoting William Paley, The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy 443
(Joshua Belcher 1811) (1785)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also William L. Twining,
Theories of Evidence: Bentham and Wigmore 98 (1985) (citing Jeremy Bentham, A Treatise
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would be a scandal for the public order to officially adopt this position. As argued
above, most of us have a basic intuition that it is profoundly wrong to punish an
innocent person.314 Imprisoning the innocent turns the state’s role as protector
against violent crime on its head and casts the state not as a benevolent protector,
but as a totalitarian monster.315
Like Norma, we face a choice of how to manage this apparent threat to the
system’s legitimacy. We can use strategies of repression and denial to maintain the
illusion or attempt to work through new information, cope with it, and possibly
amend our interpretation of reality. The latter approach is difficult, especially
if it requires that we take moral responsibility for unjust imprisonment carried
out in our names. Admitting responsibility requires us to take a more nuanced
perspective and admit that often we, as a society, may be guilty of perpetrating
injustice. In Timothy Cole’s case,316 the system could not take full account of the
conflicting evidence, including Cole’s status as a severely asthmatic nonsmoker,
until after that exculpatory detail killed him.317 It took that traumatic ending to
spur the public scrutiny of the case that would eventually lead to a posthumous
exoneration and profound changes in Texas law.318 Those changes included the
most far-reaching post-conviction compensation statute in the United States and
an advisory council to uncover wrongful convictions.319
Alternatively, one can resist the new information and try to maintain the
illusion of the system’s reliability. The complex phenomenon of denial has
been the subject of significant research since the early explorations of Sigmund
Freud and his daughter, Anna Freud.320 Denial is a coping mechanism in
which a person uses a continuum of strategies to protect him or herself from
disturbing information provided by external reality.321 It allows one to consciously
acknowledge an unpleasant fact in the guise of rejecting that fact.322 “The speaker
resolves the conflict and dispels the anxiety by ‘falsely’ getting rid of one of the
Evidence 198 (1825)) (discussing Bentham’s warning to guard against the “sentimental
exaggerations” of Blackstone’s ratio).

on

314

See supra notes 44–49 and accompanying text.

Steiker & Steiker, supra note 39, at 588 (identifying execution of the innocent as a hallmark
distinguishing totalitarian from democratic societies).
315

316

See supra notes 1–12 and accompanying text.

Peter A. Chickris & Mykal J. Fox, Present Danger: Preventing Wrongful Convictions by
Resolving Critical Issues within Texas’s Criminal Justice System, 52 S. Tex. L. Rev. 365, 367–68 (2011).
317

318

Id.

319

Id.

See Sigmund Freud, Negation, in 19 Standard Edition of the Complete Works of
Sigmund Freud 235 (J. Strachey ed., 1961) (1925); 2 Anna Freud, The Ego and the Mechanisms
of Defense: The Writings of Anna Freud 69–92 (C. Baines trans., 1966) (1937).
320

321
Shlomo Breznitz, The Seven Kinds of Denial, in The Denial of Stress 257, 257 (Shlomo
Breznitz ed., 1983).
322

Freud, supra note 320, at 235.
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two conflicting elements . . . .”323 Freud provides several examples, including a
patient who dreams of a woman who he immediately insists is not his mother.324
The analyst’s response: “So it is his mother!”325 The denial allows the patient to
describe the disturbing phenomenon while maintaining a psychological distance
from its meaning. This strategy provides a powerful way to avoid the intense inner
turmoil and anxiety posed by a potentially traumatic encounter.326
Despite modern skepticism of many of Freud’s theories, there continues
to be strong empirical evidence that people use denial to cope with difficult
situations.327 Modern studies have shown the remarkable power of denial for
maintaining one’s prior beliefs, even in the face of powerful contrary evidence.328
Our reasoning is often driven by emotion, including positive and negative feelings
about people, such as criminal convicts, which often register more quickly than
conscious thoughts.329 When we discover new information, we attempt to make
it consistent with our prior beliefs, rather than amend our beliefs to match
reality.330 One researcher describes the process in a manner that hearkens back to
the legal and procedural sources 331 of wrongful convictions: “We may think we’re
being scientists, but we’re actually being lawyers. Our ‘reasoning’ is a means to
a predetermined end—winning our ‘case’—and is shot through with biases.”332
This can make it very difficult to dislodge longstanding assumptions about a
variety of difficult topics.
Denial is a prevalent response to post-conviction innocence claims, even
in the face of overwhelming DNA evidence. This is one of many instances in
which discomforting scientific evidence results in a backlash, rather than reasoned

Duncan Kennedy, Strategizing Strategic Behavior in Legal Interpretation, 1996 Utah L. Rev.
785, 806 (1996).
323

324

Freud, supra note 320, at 235.

325

Id.

Sigmund Freud, The Problem of Anxiety 86, 97 (1936); Ekkehard Othmer, The
Clinical Interview Using DSM-IV (1994); T. Hackett et al., The Coronary-Care Unit: An
Appraisal of its Psychological Hazards, 25 New Eng. J. of Med. 1365 (1968); Bruce Winick, Client
Denial and Resistance in the Advance Directive Context: Reflections on How Attorneys Can Identify
and Deal with a Psycholegal Soft Spot, 4 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 901, 904 (1998) (citing Am.
Psychiatric Glossary 37 (J.E. Edgerton ed., 7th ed. 1994)).
326

Roy F. Baumeister et al., Freudian Defense Mechanisms and Empirical Findings in Modern
Social Psychology: Reaction Formation, Projection, Displacement, Undoing, Isolation, Sublimation, and
Denial, 66 J. of Personality 1081, 1082, 1107–1111 (1998).
327

Chris Mooney, The Science of Why We Don’t Believe Science, Mother Jones (May 2011),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/03/denial-science-chris-mooney.
328

329

Id.

330

Id.

331

See supra notes 196–210 and accompanying text
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Mooney, supra note 328.
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analysis.333 Rather than confront the terrifying reality of wrongful conviction, we
may reassure ourselves that exonerees deserve their fates, displacing the blame
onto innocent people.334 We may continue to place our faith in discredited forms
of faulty eyewitness and forensic science evidence while denying empirically
valid DNA testing evidence. This can manifest itself in outright opposition to
testing newly discovered DNA evidence or granting freedom to innocent people,
regardless of overwhelming evidence of innocence.
Denial can have a positive effect on our ability to cope with difficult
facts during times of stress.335 But, depending on the context, denial can also
be destructive, interfering with our ability to properly confront difficult
circumstances.336 In the innocence context, denial strategies are little more than
futile attempts to avoid inevitable confrontation with the traumatic idea that the
criminal justice system regularly punishes the innocent. While the argument that
our system convicts innocent people is not new,337 the advent of DNA testing and
the ensuing trend of exonerations make it more difficult to remain complacent
about wrongful convictions. We know of more than 300 wrongfully convicted
people and statistical data showing a factual error rate between 3.3% and 5%.338
333
Id. (examining research on the ability of scientific data to change strong beliefs regarding
climate change, gun violence, and the death penalty).

Aviva Orenstein, Facing the Unfaceable: Dealing with Prosecutorial Denial in Postconviction
Cases of Actual Innocence, 48 San Diego L. Rev. 401, 432–33 (2011); Scott Christianson,
Innocent: Inside Wrongful Conviction Cases 1 (2004) (“Some hard liners deny that anyone ever
gets wrongfully convicted. Those in prison, they say, must be guilty of something—otherwise they
wouldn’t be imprisoned.”). For example, see the comments of Linda Fairstein, the lead prosecutor
of the Central Park Jogger case, which came into question when DNA evidence matched another
known rapist’s DNA profile:
334

[F]our of these five men admitted over the years that they attacked others who were
assaulted in Central Park that night. It’s easy for me to keep a position that I believe
is right, so I’m comfortable with the original convictions. Throughout my 30-year
career, I’ve always maintained pride in my integrity. That’s why the DA and my
colleagues and the court trusted me all those years.
Id. (quoting Danielle Cantor, Linda Fairstein, Jewish Woman, http://www.jwi.org/Page.aspx?pid=
774 (last visited Apr. 28, 2011)).
Winick, supra note 326, at 904 –05; Alex Kuczynski, What, Me Worry?: Market Meltdowns.
Global Warming. Confounding Health Studies. Grim News Leads to a Summer of Denial. Relax, Say
Experts, It’s Good for You, N.Y. Times, July 28, 2002, at 9-1, 9-5.
335

336
Susan Bandes, Repression and Denial in Criminal Lawyering, 9 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 339,
353–54 (2006).

Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World,
82 N.C. L. Rev. 891, 900–04 (2004) (citing Edwin M. Borchard, Convicting the Innocent
(1932); Jerome Frank & Barbara Frank, Not Guilty (1957); Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L.
Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 21, 56–64 (1987)).
337

338
Risinger, supra note 13, at 762. A more recent statistical study using conservative methods
suggests that as many as 4.1% of individuals on death row in the United States may be innocent.
Ed Pilkington, US Death Row Study, The Guardian, Apr. 28, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2014/apr/28/death-penalty-study-4-percent-defendants-innocent.
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This has resulted in immense human misery and injustice. Such numbers should
alarm anyone who places faith in the system’s ability to punish the guilty and
protect the innocent. We should critically examine evidence of errors, even if that
means challenging traditional assumptions regarding the reliability of procedural
norms, due process, eyewitness evidence, and forensic science.

B. The Innocence Event
Before the advent of the innocence movement, the criminal justice system was
locked into a routine. From the traditional perspective, police officers tasked with
protecting society apprehend criminals. The state then uses an adversarial, rather
than an inquisitorial,339 process in which opposing lawyers for the state and the
accused, overseen by neutral trial and appellate judges, use zealous presentation of
evidence and witnesses to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury of the
defendant’s peers. The criminal defendant is entitled to due process guarantees and
effective representation by counsel,340 but is usually guilty of the charged offense.
Jaded lawyers involved in the process, including prosecutors, judges, and defense
lawyers,341 work hard to fulfill their respective institutional roles of providing
each defendant with due process. Yet most cases follow a standard pattern, with
a conviction or, more often, a plea bargain.342 Other than the occasional uproar
over guilty defendants receiving acquittals or new trials due to “technicalities,”
often in the form of violations of constitutional rights, this is the story of a system
that routinely produces the correct result by punishing the guilty and protecting
the innocent.
This harmonious picture leaves out important details, including substantial
racial 343 and class bias,344 troubling rates of mass incarceration,345 and inhumane
conditions in U.S. penitentiaries.346 It also assumes the factual guilt of practically
339
See generally David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1634 (2009)
(assessing the merits of inquisitorial and adversarial approaches to criminal justice).
340

See supra notes 196–209 and accompanying text.

See Bandes, supra note 336 (examining the denial mechanisms used by defense attorneys to
cope with the possibility of client guilt).
341

See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Just., FY 2014 Performance Budget Congressional Submission
21–22 (2014), http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2014justification/pdf/usa-justification.pdf (citing and
projecting a 90% favorable resolution rate based on target number of convictions and terminations).
342

343

See supra note 63 and accompanying text.

See generally David Cole, No Equal Justice: Race and Class in the American Criminal
Justice System (1999); Matt Taibbi, The Divide: American Injustice in the Age of the Wealth
Gap (2014).
344

345
See generally Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age
Colorblindness (2010); Frontline: Locked Up in America (PBS Apr. 22, 2014), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/locked-up-in-america/.

of

See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1933–34 (2011) (holding severe overcrowding in California prisons violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment).
346
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all prisoners.347 Post-conviction DNA testing and innocence claims expose the
falsity of this part of the traditional story.348 Despite traditions of certainty in
the results provided by the criminal justice system, we now have clear evidence
that the system gets it wrong. Given the large number of exonerations,349
commentators have moved from arguing about whether wrongful convictions
occur to the more difficult question of determining why they occur and how to
stop them.350 What had been a slowly developing movement to uncover piecemeal
wrongful convictions exploded into a full-blown movement following the advent
of DNA fingerprinting, which made it possible to demonstrate a prisoner’s factual
innocence to an unprecedented degree of near certainty.351
Popular discontent with the legal system is not new. For a few examples,
consider the controversial outcome of the O.J. Simpson trial,352 half-understood
stories about lawsuits over hot coffee,353 anger about the release of rapists and
murderers on “technicalities,”354 and constant outrage over the latest high profile
trial on cable news.355 The second half of the twentieth century was marked
by significant popular, political, and judicial questioning of the legal system’s
legitimacy.356 Yet general popular discontent with the system rarely resulted in
meaningful governmental reforms to protect criminal defendants and prisoners.
Individual legislators, if not legislative bodies as a whole, continue to receive
popular support on election day.357 This is so even after Congress and state
legislatures have criminalized large segments of American life while continually
347
See Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 197–98 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that
the wrongful conviction rate is infinitesimal).
348
See Gross et al., supra note 72, at 523–24 (noting how exonerations, once viewed as
aberrations, have become common following DNA testing availability); Lawrence C. Marshall, The
Innocence Revolution and the Death Penalty, 1 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 573, 573 (2004).
349
DNA Exoneree Case Profiles, The Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
know/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2014).
350

Drizin & Leo, supra note 337, at 906.

351

Id. at 904–05; Gross et al., supra note 72.

Craig M. Bradley & Joseph L. Hoffman, Public Perception, Justice, and the “Search for Truth”
in Criminal Cases, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1267, 1285 (1996).
352

Kimberly Atkins, Pouring Cold Water on the ‘Hot Coffee’ Lawsuit Legend, Lawyers USA,
June 24, 2011.
353

354

Rosen, supra note 204, at 237.

See Lincoln Mitchell, Zimmerman’s Acquittal Shows How Little Has Changed, Huffington
Post (July 16, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lincoln-mitchell/zimmermans-acquittalshow_b_3604053.html; Casey Anthony Probation Debacle: Is Florida Justice Now Facing a Public
Relations Crisis?, PRNewsChannel (Aug. 5, 2011), http://www.prnewschannel.com/2011/08/05/
casey-anthony-probation-debacle-is-florida-justice-now-facing-a-public-relations-crisis/.
355

356
Franklin E. Zimring & David T. Johnson, Public Opinion and the Governance of Punishment
in Democratic Political Systems, 605 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 266, 276 (2006).

See Corinna Barret Lain, Upside-Down Judicial Review, 101 Geo. L.J. 113, 150–51 (2012)
(discussing high incumbency reelection rates).
357
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increasing the length of mandatory minimum sentences.358 The United States now
leads the world in terms of mass incarceration and does so to the extraordinarily
disproportionate detriment of racial minorities.359 This trend may be beginning
to change.360 Nonetheless, up until now, it has been possible for policymakers,
lawyers, and the public to retain their faith in the system’s results, despite being
generally dissatisfied with the justice system, by emphasizing that convicts deserve
their fates and that their incarceration keeps us safe.
There are controversies over the material causes of mass incarceration.361 But
our perspective on the meaning of guilt and innocence played a role in allowing
us to rationalize its occurrence. The justice system and the public can convince
themselves that the multiple checks provided by due process at trial and on
direct appeal 362 make wrongful convictions an aberration, rather than a systemic
problem. This, in turn, eases dismissal of the concerns of any person convicted of
a crime. If the system always gets it right, then it is much easier to view prisoners
and felons as being wholly different from the rest of us. The prisoner comes to
fill the role of an evil “Other,” beyond hope of redemption, deserving the direct
and collateral consequences of conviction—if not even worse consequences—and
undeserving of universal human empathy or love.363
Innocence claims can represent the beginning of a transformative event that
disturbs these long-held assumptions. This potential comes from the foundational
challenge to our long-held beliefs that the system’s procedural accuracy allows it
to protect us from crime while fairly punishing the guilty. DNA testing and the
innocence movement force us to acknowledge the existence and dignity of innocent
convicts. No longer erased from society in maximum-security penitentiaries,
wrongfully convicted people can step into the sunlight with dignity and educate
us about their experiences. The exoneration comes as a complete surprise: the

358
See Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow, The Nation (Mar. 9, 2010), http://www.
thenation.com/article/new-jim-crow; Vanita Gupta, How to Really End Mass Incarceration, N.Y.
Times (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/15/opinion/how-to-really-end-massincarceration.html?_r=0; Fareed Zakaria, Incarceration Nation, Time (Apr. 2, 2012), http://content.
time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2109777,00.html.

See generally Alexander, supra note 345; Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost
of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1271 (2004); Darryl
Pinckney, Invisible Black America, N.Y. Rev. of Books (Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.nybooks.
com/articles/archives/2011/mar/10/invisible-black-america/.
359

360

See David Cole, Turning the Corner on Mass Incarceration?, 9 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 27 (2011).

Andrew E. Taslitz, The Criminal Republic: Democratic Breakdown as a Cause of Mass
Incarceration, 9 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 133, 134 (2011).
361

362

See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 398–99 (1993).

Judges, supra note 304, at 174–81 (citing John P. Kirscht & Ronald C. Dillehay,
Dimensions of Authoritarianism: A Review of Research and Theory 110 (1967)) (describing
dehumanization and out-group hostility as ways that authoritarianism can provide an unconscious
defense against anxiety).
363
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prisoner was already found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury based
on apparently overwhelming evidence. The status quo story, including all of the
evidence available at trial and on appeal, cannot account for the incredible image
of an exonerated person leaving the prison gates, speaking to reporters, and living
and working next to us as another member of society.
This process is shocking and unpleasant. We may have spent our lives labeling
different people as “good” and “bad” and placing faith in the criminal justice
system’s ability to protect the former and punish the latter. The very discomfort
and aberration from traditional practices posed by innocence claims provides the
source of DNA exoneration’s potential use as one of many tools for transforming
public attitudes towards the criminal justice system.364 The seemingly impossible
appearance of the exonerated prisoner resembles the beginning of an event that
represents a break from the routine of the status quo.365 For a moment, the sharp
difference between the innocent (“us”) and the guilty (“them”) is suspended,
allowing each of us to affirm the prisoner’s identity as a thinking being.366 The
trauma of this event can then give way to long-term social change if people who
experience it find it “impossible . . . to carry on as before”367 and remain faithful
to the original event by carrying it to the inevitable consequences of challenging
assumptions of the criminal justice system’s accuracy and fairness.
What accounts for the significant power posed by the recent successes of the
innocence movement? Using newly discovered evidence to challenge someone’s
conviction is not novel. The source of the recent movement’s power comes from
the extraordinary reliability of DNA testing, which is unparalleled by other types
of evidence, such as subjective eyewitness testimony:
[Exculpatory DNA evidence] has an entirely different level of
probity. In these cases, the new evidence is usually not competing
evidence of the same type and weight as that presented at
trial. The degree of certainty of innocence is so high that it
is unlikely to be outweighed by any evidence in the record.
Evidence that goes beyond the mere suggestion of innocence
and demonstrably establishes innocence should form, by itself,
a basis for habeas review of convictions and imprisonment.
Where the evidence palpably shows actual innocence, the
legitimacy of the state is unequivocally and transparently at
stake. Continued incarceration cannot be charitably construed
364

See Liebman, supra note 124, at 543–48. See generally Medwed, supra note 15.

See Peter Hallward, Introduction: Consequences of Abstraction, in Think Again: Alain
Badiou and the Future of Philosophy 1, 2–3 (P. Hallward ed., 2004).
365

366
Cf. id. at 7 (describing a situation in which procedures for distinguishing employees and
employers break down).
367

Id. at 3.
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as reflecting the difficulties of weighing conflicting new and old
evidence or as reflecting a systemic concern to place the burden
of timely complaint on the defendant. Blinking at the evidence
of innocence may have been understandable in Herrera, but it
should be unthinkable here.368
In this sense, DNA is different.369 Rather than being one more piece of cumulative
evidence weighing against the mountain of evidence that already convinced a jury
of someone’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, DNA testing is often dispositive of
innocence. In many cases, despite the appearance of the overwhelming evidence
of guilt, DNA testing evidence arrives to resolve the plot at the last minute, like a
deus ex machina device, setting everything right in the end.370
DNA innocence claims often result in public outrage when courts or
prosecutors refuse to recognize the overwhelming evidence of innocence.371 If
state actors prove unwilling to seriously consider post-conviction claims in the
face of highly accurate DNA testing results, the public may lose confidence in
the criminal justice system.372 Mounting public pressure may force the state to,

Development in the Law—Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, 108 Harv.
L. Rev. 1557, 1581–82 (1995).
368

E.g., Garrett, supra note 125, at 1647; see also Dist. Att’y’s Office for Third Jud. Dist. v.
Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 55 (2009) (“DNA testing has an unparalleled ability both to exonerate the
wrongly convicted and to identify the guilty.”).
369

“Deus ex machina” refers to “(in ancient Greek and Roman drama) a god introduced into
a play to resolve the entanglements of the plot. 2. any artificial or improbable device resolving the
difficulties of a plot.” Deus Ex Machina Definition, Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.
com/browse/deus+ex+machina?s=t (last visited Apr. 28, 2014). For example, when all seems lost in
the War of the Worlds, the human species is suddenly saved by the aliens’ contraction of the flu. H.G.
Wells, The War of the Worlds (1898).
370

The threshold of discomfort necessary for the public to question the legitimacy
of a conviction may be less stringent than that applied by a judge in a typical post-conviction
proceeding. Todd E. Pettys, Killing Roger Coleman: Habeas, Finality, and the Innocence Gap, 48 Wm.
& Mary L. Rev. 2313, 2350–52 (2007). But many prosecutors cling to the veracity of the original
verdict, often in the face of contrary DNA evidence. Adele Bernhard, Justice Still Fails: A Review of
Recent Efforts to Compensate Individuals Who Have Been Unjustly Convicted and Later Exonerated, 52
Drake L. Rev. 703, 716 (2004).
371

372
Jonathan M. Kirshbaum, Actual Innocence after Friedman v. Rehal: The Second Circuit
Pursues a New Mechanism for Seeking Justice in Actual Innocence Cases, 31 Pace L. Rev. 627, 671
(2011) (citing Brandon Segal, Comment, Habeas Corpus, Equitable Tolling, and AEDPA’s Statute
of Limitations: Why the Schlup v. Delo Gateway Standard for Claims of Actual Innocence Fails to
Alleviate the Plight of Wrongfully Convicted Americans, 31 U. Haw. L. Rev. 225, 238, 249, 250
(2008); Pettys, supra note 371, at 2350; Limin Zheng, Comment, Actual Innocence as a Gateway
Through the Statute of Limitations Bar on the Filing of Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions, 90 Calif.
L. Rev. 2101, 2136 (2002)); Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 Minn. L. Rev. 248, 323
(1988) (“Although the concept of ‘actual innocence’ has not explicitly played a part in federal postconviction jurisprudence until recently, it is obvious that an enlightened system of justice should
not tolerate continued incarceration of one who is demonstrably innocent.”).
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perhaps reluctantly, confront its mistake.373 It may also impress the significance
of the problem on the gatekeepers, including law enforcement, prosecuting
and defense attorneys, legislators, and judges, who must play a role in stopping
wrongful convictions.374 That may help pave the way for more systemic legal and
attitudinal changes addressing the way we incarcerate people or characteristics
that make it more difficult to stop wrongful convictions.375
The discomfort of engaging the institutional failures posed by wrongful
convictions helps explain the often-intense opposition to actual innocence
claims.376 DNA testing is still a relatively new technology. While its results can
provide the closest thing forensic science offers to certainty, it relies on data not
immediately perceptible as part of our day-to-day experiences. DNA results can
therefore appear almost unreal, especially when clashing with our intuitions
about traditional, yet faulty, methods of criminal identification. For example, it
may be difficult to reassess a victim’s sincere testimony based on an expert’s dry
testimony regarding invisible strands of DNA described in a cold, passionless
lab report. It can also be difficult to dislodge years of tunnel vision regarding a
particular prisoner’s guilt.377 Discomfort with confronting the falsity of our beliefs
about the criminal justice system can manifest itself in denial, whereby a person
unconsciously determines that the unpleasant reality that we punish innocent
people is too horrible to be real, thereby giving rise to unconscious strategies of
denial in the face of powerful evidence—such as Norma’s fantasy that she remains
a Hollywood star or a lawyer’s denial that a person could be innocent.378
373

Gross et al., supra note 72, at 525.

One commentator has argued that a post-conviction focus, at least in the context of
habeas corpus petitions, can be shortsighted for the anti-death penalty movement, creating perverse
incentives, lowering standards for trials, and failing to provide effective feedback to the participants
in the system who are arguably responsible for the production of death sentences. James S. Liebman,
The Overproduction of Death, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 2030, 2032–33, 2045–46, 2119–20 (2000).
Factual innocence claims may address this problem by (1) focusing on the problem of factual
innocence and (2) forcing frontend actors, including the very courts and prosecuting attorneys
responsible for the conduct of criminal trials, to confront innocence claims. For example, see the
experience of Illinois, in which innocence claims helped pave the way for a reassessment capital
punishment in the state. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 39, at 607–08 (noting the Illinois experience,
but also suggesting the possible pitfalls of an innocence focus).
374

375

Rosen, supra note 204, at 237–39.

Medwed, supra note 15, at 1552–58 (summarizing arguments raised against the innocence
movement); Karen Christian, Note, “And the DNA Shall Set You Free”: Issues Surrounding Post
conviction DNA Evidence and the Pursuit of Innocence, 62 Ohio St. L.J. 1195, 1198–99 (2001)
(describing the case of Roy Criner, who was denied post-conviction relief based on exclusion by
DNA evidence, but was eventually pardoned by Texas Governor George W. Bush).
376

377

Findley & Scott, supra note 66, at 343–46.

See Orenstein, supra note 334, at 428 (citing Stanley Cohen, States of Denial: Knowing
About Atrocities and Suffering 5 (2001); Richard S. Tedlow, Denial: Why Business Leaders
Fail To Look Facts in the Face—And What To Do About it 33–34 (2010); David S. Caudill,
Freud and Critical Legal Studies: Contours of a Radical Socio-Legal Psychoanalysis, 66 Ind. L.J. 651,
658–59 (1991); Jonathan R. Cohen, The Immorality of Denial, 79 Tul. L. Rev. 903, 910–11 (2005)).
378
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Prosecutors provide a good example of this effect.379 Prosecutors’ offices
commonly resist motions for testing or new trials requested based on highly reliable
DNA results excluding the prisoner as the source of the biological evidence,380
only relenting after going through expensive and time-consuming litigation over
the matter or in response to intense public pressure. Prosecutors face substantial
institutional and psychological pressures to resist innocence and exoneration
claims.381 This makes sense in light of the attorneys’ identification with their
office and the psychological need to confirm intuitions of guilt solidified by a
past conviction:
If anything, these tendencies have an even greater impact
following a conviction, given the psychological difficulty of
acknowledging one’s possible role in convicting an innocent
person. A prosecutor will tend to view a conviction as a
confirmation that his initial charging decision was correct
and will naturally discount new evidence of innocence.
These tendencies will be most pronounced for the particular
prosecutors who had responsibility for investigating and trying
a case, but it will also inhere in the district attorney or other
prosecutor in charge of the office that obtained the conviction,
in its supervisory prosecutors, and in others who identify with
the office and its work.382
We know very little regarding the full rationale for prosecutors’ decisions to resist
DNA testing and exonerations because of the lack of transparency regarding
internal decision-making.383 But it is unsurprising that internal and external
incentives and psychological resistance can cause such opposition.
Despite these pressures, prosecutors have a special duty to ensure that the
innocent individuals do not remain behind bars. As recently reiterated by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit:
A prosecutor “is the representative not of an ordinary party to
a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and
379

Orenstein, supra note 334, at 430 –31.

Bernhard, supra note 371, at 716; Gross et al., supra note 72, at 525–26; Daniel S. Medwed,
The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 125,
138–69 (2004).
380

381

Medwed, supra note 380, at 138– 69.

382

Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 246, at 489–90.

Id. at 481 (citing James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 Harv. L. Rev.
1521, 1566 (1981)). But see Sylvia Moreno, New Prosecutor Revisits Justice in Dallas, Wash. Post,
Mar. 5, 2007 (describing a Dallas prosecutor who created a unit to investigate wrongful convictions).
383
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whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.” More succinctly:
“The prosecutor’s job isn’t just to win, but to win fairly, staying
well within the rules.”384
That case involved the unusual situation of a prosecutor admitting to having
made improper references during closing argument and voluntarily moving for
summary reversal of a defendant’s conviction and vacation of the sentence.385
This admission shocked some commentators.386 But it remains true that, at least
in theory, prosecutors have special duties as ministers of justice, rather than as
traditional advocates, to ensure that innocent individuals do not experience
wrongful punishment.387 Unfortunately, this duty can have the perverse effect of
discouraging critical reassessment of convictions because admitting error means
admitting the prosecutor’s role in perpetrating an injustice.388 Nonetheless, there
United States v. Maloney, No. 11-50311, 2014 WL 801450, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 28, 2014)
(internal citations omitted) (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); United States v.
Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1323 (9th Cir. 1993)).
384

385

Id.

See Andrew Cohen, When Prosecutors Admit to Cheating, The Atlantic (Mar. 4, 2014), http://
www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/03/when-prosecutors-admit-to-cheating/284180/.
386

387
See Wyo. R. Prof’l Conduct 3.8 cmt. 1 (“A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister
of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations
to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of
sufficient evidence.”). The Model Rules go even further in the post-conviction context:

(g) When a prosecutor knows of new, credible and material evidence creating a
reasonable likelihood that a convicted defendant did not commit an offense of
which the defendant was convicted, the prosecutor shall:
(1) promptly disclose that evidence to an appropriate court or authority, and
(2) if the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction,
(i)

promptly disclose that evidence to the defendant unless a court authorizes
delay, and

(ii) undertake further investigation, or make reasonable efforts to cause an
investigation, to determine whether the defendant was convicted of an offense
that the defendant did not commit.
(h) When a prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence establishing that a
defendant in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction was convicted of an offense that the
defendant did not commit, the prosecutor shall seek to remedy the conviction.
Model R. Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(g), (h). The Wyoming State Bar’s Board of Officers and
Commissioners recently recommended adopting this language, including commentary, from the
Model Rules. Report of Ad Hoc Advisory Committee to Update Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct 99 (Apr. 2014), available at http://www.wyomingbar.org/pdf/2014_WRPC_
Revisions.pdf.
388
Orenstein, supra note 334, at 431–32 (citing Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial
Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1587, 1593 (2006);
Carol Tavris & Elliot Aronson, Mistakes Were Made (But Not by Me): Why We Justify
Foolish Beliefs, Bad Decisions, and Hurtful Acts 156 (2007); Kathryn Schulz, Being Wrong:
Adventures in the Margin of Error 233–35 (2010)).
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are clearly other considerations at play in prosecutorial decisions, which may not
change absent systemic changes in prosecutorial institutions.

C. Assessing Wyoming’s Statute
Wyoming adopted one of the more recent post-conviction DNA statutes
when it passed the 2008 Post-Conviction DNA Testing Act (the Act).389 The
Joint Interim Judiciary Committee developed the bill in cooperation with the
Rocky Mountain Innocence Center, Wyoming district attorneys, and the law
enforcement community.390 Its structure provides useful examples of how postconviction DNA testing and innocence claims benefit the wrongfully convicted
and the justice system as a whole by allowing us to confront our mistakes and to
correct and prevent wrongful convictions.

1. Testing Requirements
Wyoming’s statute permits a person convicted of a felony offense to move
the district court for a post-conviction DNA testing order.391 The category of
potential movants authorized by Wyoming’s statute, all felons, is rather broad.
Other state statutes restrict certain kinds of defendants (e.g. those convicted of
lesser crimes) from requesting post-conviction testing.392 The movant must assert
under oath and provide a “particularized factual basis” for certain facts including:
(i)

Why DNA evidence is material to:

(A) The identity of the perpetrator of, or accomplice to, the crime;
(B) A sentence enhancement; or
(C) An aggravating factor alleged in a capital case.
(ii)

That evidence is still in existence and is in a condition that
allows DNA testing to be conducted;

(iii) That the chain of custody is sufficient to establish that the
evidence has not been substituted, contaminated or altered in
any material aspect that would prevent reliable DNA testing;
389
See S.F. No. 65, 59th Leg., Budg. Sess. (Wyo. 2008) (codifying Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-12302 to -315 (2013)).
390
Motion for New Trial Filed for Wyoming Man, Rocky Mt. Innocence Ctr. (Mar. 30,
2013), http://rminnocence.org/2013/03/motion-for-new-trial-filed-for-wyoming-man-recent-dnatesting-likely-to-prove-his-innocence/.
391
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-12-303(c) (2013). A movant may not waive the right to file a motion
for post-conviction DNA testing. Id. § 7-12-312(a).
392

Garrett, supra note 125, at 1679–80.
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(iv) That the specific evidence to be tested can be identified;
(v)

That the type of DNA testing to be conducted is specified;

(vi) That the DNA testing employs a scientific method sufficiently
reliable and relevant to be admissible under the Wyoming
Rules of Evidence;
(vii) That a theory of defense can be presented, not inconsistent
with theories previously asserted at trial, that the requested
DNA testing would support;
(viii) That the evidence was not previously subjected to DNA
testing, or if the evidence was previously tested one (1) of the
following would apply:
(A) The result of the testing was inconclusive;
(B) The evidence was not subjected to the testing that is now
requested, and the new testing may resolve an issue not resolved
by the prior testing; or
(C) The requested DNA test would provide results that are
significantly more accurate and probative of the identity of the
perpetrator or accomplice.
(ix) That the evidence that is the subject of the request for testing
has the potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence that
will establish the movant’s actual innocence.393
As in many states, the statute makes the local prosecutor’s involvement
critical to the ease of post-conviction proceedings.394 The movant must serve
the motion on the district attorney in the county where the conviction occurred
and any government agency or laboratory holding evidence for which testing
is requested.395 The district attorney then has sixty days—unless granted an
extension—to support or oppose the motion, recommend a particular type
of DNA testing, object to the proposed laboratory, or enter other objections,
recommendations, or requests.396 Obtaining testing is much simpler if the

393

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-12-303(c) (2013).

394

Medwed, supra note 380, at 127–30.

395
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-12-304(a) (2013). The district attorney, in turn, must notify the
victim (as defined by Wyo. Stat. § 1-40-202(a)(ii)) of the motion, the time and place for hearing,
and the result of the motion. Id. § 7-12-311.
396

Id. §§ 7-12-304(b), (c).
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district attorney consents to testing, as occurred in Wyoming’s sole, successful
motion for post-conviction DNA testing before publication of this article.397
The U.S. Justice Department recommends cooperation between prosecutors,
defendants, and courts in cases where DNA testing may conclusively determine a
prisoner’s innocence.398
The prospect of future cooperation by Wyoming prosecutors remains unclear.
Prosecutors in other states commonly fight claims for post-conviction DNA
testing 399 requiring delays and evidentiary hearings regarding the probative nature
of the requested testing. Even after testing excludes the movant, prosecutors
often show remarkable resiliency in continuing to oppose motions for new trials,
“hypothesizing the existence of ‘unindicted co-ejaculators’ . . . to explain how the
defendant can still be guilty, though another man’s semen is found on the rapemurder victim.”400 Alternatively, a prosecutor may deny the full meaning of DNA
evidence by recasting the available evidence, perhaps minimizing the importance
of biological evidence that was deemed critical at trial or creating new, implausible
theories of the crime to match new evidence.401
To an outsider, this opposition can seem odd, given the uniquely probative
nature of DNA evidence and the state’s strong interest in not punishing innocent
people. However, as explained above, prosecutors experience strong psychological,
social, political, and institutional pressures to obstruct testing claims.402 There are
several explanations for prosecutorial resistance to innocence claims, including
political risk, psychological barriers, and institutional incentives.403 The recent
failure by the Wyoming Legislature to pass compensation and non-DNA
exoneration bills suggests that Wyoming prosecutors may attempt to obstruct
future innocence claims.404 But as in many other states,405 prosecutors will continue
to play a significant role in determining prisoners’ viable access to post-conviction
DNA testing under Wyoming’s statute.

397
Megan Cassidy, Wyoming’s First Post-Conviction DNA Test Will Quell Doubts, One Way or
Another, Casper Star Trib. (Feb. 26, 2013), http://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/wyoming-s-firstpost-conviction-dna-test-will-quell-doubts/article_19baf5e5-7e5a-5898-8e89-5ab7582a7e7b.html
(“‘Nobody, especially prosecutors, wants to see someone in prison who shouldn’t be,’ [one prosecutor]
said. ‘That’s our main duty as prosecutors. There is no harm in getting this evidence tested.’”).
398

DOJ Recommendations, supra note 249, at iii.

See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Exoneration, http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/librarysite/
garrett_ exoneration.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2014).
399

400

Liebman, supra note 124, at 543; accord Lugosi, supra note 147, at 235.

401

Orenstein, supra note 334, at 430.

402

See generally Medwed, supra note 380.

403

Medwed, supra note 380, at 138–69.

404

See infra notes 517–45 and accompanying text.

405

Medwed, supra note 380, at 127–28.
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If the DNA motion complies with Wyo. Stat. § 7-12-303(c) and the state
has an opportunity to respond, the district court must set a hearing within ninety
days of the motion’s filing.406 If possible, the hearing will be before the judge who
conducted the initial trial.407 Whether this is possible depends on how much time
has passed since trial, which can be decades for many DNA cases. The movant and
state may present evidence through testimony or sworn and notarized affidavits
served on opposing parties at least fifteen days before the hearing.408
To obtain testing, the movant must present a prima facie case showing that
evidence supports findings consistent with those asserted in the DNA testing
motion and that, assuming exculpatory results,409 establishes (i) the movant’s
actual innocence or (ii) in a capital case, (A) actual innocence of an aggravating
circumstance or (B) a mitigating circumstance shown by DNA testing.410 One
potential problem facing movants is the immense difficulty of making a prima
facie case that DNA testing results are consistent with factual innocence before the
evidence is tested. Unlike under some state statutes, Wyoming’s statute assumes
testing will provide exculpatory results.411 This is important for enabling viable
innocence claims because, in a post-conviction context, a jury already found
evidence establishing the movant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Courts assign
an enormous amount of credibility in the accuracy and finality of such verdicts.412
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-12-305(a) (2013). If the motion does not comply with those
requirements, the court may deny the motion without a hearing. Id.
406

Id. § 7-12-305(b). While having the same judge hear the case may interfere with objectivity,
this situation does not appear to have arisen under Wyoming’s statute.
407

408

Id. § 7-12-305(c).

The Act does not define “exculpatory results,” but this phrase generally refers to evidence
tending to establish the movant’s innocence. See Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009); United
States v. Blackley, 986 F. Supp. 600, 603 (D.D.C. 1997) (“[E]xculpatory [is] defined as that which
would tend to show freedom from fault, guilt or blame.”); cf. Dist. Att’y’s Office for Third Jud.
Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 77 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring) (noting the Brady v. Maryland
definition of exculpatory evidence as that which is favorable to the accused an material to guilt
or punishment). In the context of DNA testing, an exculpatory result would likely be a test
showing that the movant could be excluded as the source of a sample of biological material left at
a crime scene.
409

410

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-12-305(d) (2013).

Compare id. (“DNA testing of the specified evidence would, assuming exculpatory results,
establish . . . .”), and Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-413(1)(a) (2014) (requiring a movant to show that
“favorable results” would demonstrate actual innocence), with D.C. Code § 22-4133(d) (2014)
(requiring a movant to demonstrate a reasonable probability that testing will produce exculpatory
evidence). For a thorough discussion of this issue, see Justin Brooks & Alexander Simpson, Blood
Sugar Sex Magik: A Review of Postconviction DNA Testing Statutes and Legislative Recommendations,
59 Drake L. Rev. 799, 811–20 (2011). See also Garrett, supra note 270, at 1676 (“Currently, only
three states, Kansas, Nebraska, and Wyoming, allow access to testing on a showing that there is a
likelihood that DNA could be probative of innocence.”).
411

See, e.g., Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 205 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc)
superseded by statute as recognized by Ex parte Blue, 230 S.W.3d 151 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (“[In
a sufficiency of the evidence review,] [w]e view the evidence in a manner favorable to the verdict of
412
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Unless the court assumes exculpatory results, the available evidence—including
eyewitness statements and potentially invalid or outdated forensic science
methods—may make it impossible to assert a prima facie case of innocence, thus
possibly rendering the statute a nullity. Unlike many other types of evidence, it is
impossible to know whether genetic evidence is actually exculpatory and probative
of innocence until tested.413 But after testing, the results can completely invalidate
most of the other evidence at issue. DNA testing can exclude an individual to
a degree of probability bordering on certainty.414 Failing to assume exculpatory
results requires a judge to weigh potentially overwhelming, yet untested evidence,
against evidence that is practically conclusive due to prior fact finding by a jury,
making it impossible to fairly assess the true potential weight of DNA evidence.
Despite these positive features, Wyoming’s statute poses a potential obstacle
to individuals seeking post-conviction DNA testing. If the movant establishes
a prima facie case for the facts specified by Wyo. Stat. § 7-12-303(c), then the
district court may order testing.415 The statute’s use of the word “may” suggests
the district court has discretion to order testing, creating the possibility of a
court denying a testing motion requested by both the movant and the district
attorney.416 The district court need not provide a rationale for its decision. An
innocent prisoner would have little practical recourse against the district court’s
discretion, other than the limited appeal rights provided by the statute.417 While
this situation has not yet occurred, it remains possible under the statute.
Of course, post-conviction DNA claims raise additional expenses associated
with both new hearings 418 and DNA testing itself.419 The claims may also
interfere with the value our system places on the policy goal of finality.420 While
guilty. In practice, this means we assume that the jury weighed lightly the exculpatory evidence and
disbelieved entirely the exculpatory witnesses. We make this assumption no matter how powerful
the exculpatory evidence may seem to us or how credible the defense witnesses may appear.”).
413

Buskirk, supra note 272, at 1608.

414

Garrett, supra note 125, at 1647.

415

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-12-305(e) (2013).

Brooks & Simpson, supra note 411, at 816; cf. Duke v. State, 2009 WY 74, 209 P.3d 563
(Wyo. 2009) (holding the legislature’s use of the word “may” in the Addicted Offender Accountability
Act gave the district court discretion to impose a sentence of probation or imprisonment).
416

417

See infra notes 492– 97 and accompanying text.

418

See, e.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 487–88 (1986).

See Brooke A. Masters, DNA Testing in Old Cases Is Disputed; Lack of National Policy Raises
Fairness Issue, Wash. Post, Sept. 10, 2000, at A1. But see Garrett, supra note 125, at 1708 & n.383
(describing the relatively low cost of DNA testing, which can be a few thousand dollars at the most
and is frequently less). While many statutes require the state to pay for DNA testing, they often do
so only if the result is favorable to the movant. See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-12-309 (2013).
419

See, e.g., Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 555–59 (1998); Murray, 477 U.S. at 487
(“Those costs . . . include a reduction in the finality of litigation and the frustration of ‘both the
States’ sovereign power to punish offenders and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional
420
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understandable, those concerns do not outweigh the tremendous affront to
individual liberty posed by continuing to imprison factually innocent people.421
Any threat to the integrity of the system posed by post-conviction review 422 is
dwarfed by the threat to the legitimacy of the legal system posed by the public’s
loss of confidence in a system that turns a blind eye towards factual innocence.423
To the extent such risks exist, they are strongly mitigated by statutory requirements
that the movant provide a good faith claim of actual innocence based on existing
DNA evidence.424 These requirements prevent the feared onslaught of repeated,
frivolous claims, completely unmoored from indicia of factual innocence.425
Finally, arguments about costs fail to take into account other costs of imprisoning
the wrong person, including the negative consequences of allowing the freedom
of true perpetrators.426

2. Evidence Preservation
One serious danger facing the factually innocent prisoner is the possibility
of evidence being lost, destroyed, or no longer in a condition susceptible to
testing.427 Current DNA testing methods, which can be effective for smaller and

rights,’ are heightened in several respects when a trial default occurs: the default deprives the trial
court of an opportunity to correct any error without retrial, detracts from the importance of the
trial itself, gives state appellate courts no chance to review trial errors, and ‘exacts an extra charge by
undercutting the State’s ability to enforce its procedural rules.’” (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S.
107, 128–29 (1982) (internal citations omitted)); Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
421
Daina Borteck, Note, Pleas for DNA Testing: Why Lawmakers Should Amend State PostConviction DNA Testing Statutes to Apply to Prisoners Who Pled Guilty, 25 Cardozo L. Rev. 1429,
1467 (2004) (arguing post-conviction statutes represent a policy judgment that the wrong of
wrongful imprisonment outweighs concerns for finality, even in cases of guilty pleas); Nicholas
Kristoff, Is Rape Serious?, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 2009, at A27.

See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 491 (1991) (“Perpetual disrespect for the finality of
convictions disparages the entire criminal system.”); Murray, 477 U.S. at 487; Reed, 468 U.S. at 10.
422

See supra notes 349–74 and accompanying text; Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, The
Verdict: Dishonor, Chi. Trib., Jan. 10, 1999, at 1 (“The failure of prosecutors to obey the demands
of justice—and the legal system’s failure to hold them accountable for it—leads to wrongful
convictions, and retrials and appeals that cost taxpayers millions of dollars. It also fosters a corrosive
distrust in a branch of government that America holds up as a standard to the world.”).
423

424

See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-12-303(c) (2013).

425

Garrett, supra note 125, at 1708–09.

426

Id. at 1708; Medwed, supra note 15, at 1564.

Barry Scheck & Peter Neufeld, DNA and Innocence Scholarship, in Wrongly Convicted:
Perspectives on Failed Justice 241, 245 (Saundra D. Westervelt & John A. Humphrey eds.,
2001) (“In 75 percent of Innocence Project cases, matters in which it has been established that a
favorable DNA result would be sufficient to vacate the inmate’s conviction, the relevant biological
evidence has either been destroyed or lost.”); Barry Scheck, Peter Neufeld & Jim Dwyer, Actual
Innocence 262 (2000); Nat’l Comm’n on the Future of DNA Evidence, supra note 182, at 46;
Teresa N. Chen, The Youngblood Success Stories: Overcoming the “Bad Faith” Destruction of Evidence
Standard, 109 W. Va. L. Rev. 421, 422 (2007); David L. Faigman et al., supra note 180, § 31:14.
427
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more degraded samples,428 and increased awareness regarding the importance of
preserving biological evidence partially ameliorate the problem. Nonetheless,
evidence from long closed cases may not be preserved with care. Police departments
and courts occasionally misplace or destroy evidence. Accidents and acts of nature,
such as fires and floods, can also eliminate useful evidence. Loss of such evidence
destroys any chance to challenge a conviction using DNA evidence.429
Under Wyoming’s statute, if the motion claims the evidence is in state custody,
the court must order the state to preserve it, prepare an inventory, and submit the
inventory to the movant and the court.430 If the evidence is no longer available,
the state must notify the court and movant, explain the loss or destruction, and
provide chain of custody documentation.431 That provides little practical recourse
for a prisoner who could have been exonerated by evidence that no longer exists.432
Without testing, near conclusive evidence of guilt, supported by a jury verdict
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, will remain in place. One possible solution
would be to permit courts to impose sanctions for bad faith evidence destruction,
possibly including sentence reduction, new trials, or sentence vacation, for the
wrongful destruction of evidence.433 Courts already use a stringent “bad faith”
standard to determine whether evidence destruction amounts to a denial of due
process.434 This standard requires not simply negligence, but evidence of police
conduct showing awareness that the evidence could form a basis for exoneration.435
In practice, this standard has been notoriously difficult to meet.436 It may therefore
be prudent to allow courts to pragmatically weigh different factors, including the
state’s bad faith, the importance of the evidence, and other evidence of guilt.437 Yet
as of 2014, no serious remedy for evidence loss or destruction exists in Wyoming.

428

Ming W. Chin et al., Forensic DNA Evidence: Science and the Law § 2:3 (2013).

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-12-303(c) (2013) (requiring a movant requesting testing to make
a prima facie case that the evidence exists in a condition subject to testing).
429

430

Id. § 7-12-304(d).

431

Id.

Catherine Greene Burnett, “If Only”: Best Practices for Evidence Retention in the Wake of the
DNA Revolution, 52 S. Tex. L. Rev. 335, 355–56 (2011); Cynthia E. Jones, Evidence Destroyed,
Innocence Lost: The Preservation of Biological Evidence under Innocence Protection Statutes, 42 Am. Crim.
L. Rev. 1239, 1257–58 (2005) (describing such statutes as providing a right without a remedy).
432

Cynthia E. Jones, The Right Remedy for the Wrongfully Convicted: Judicial Sanctions for
Destruction of DNA Evidence, 77 Fordham L. Rev. 2893, 2944–53 (2009).
433

434
E.g., Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57–58 (1988); Williams v. State, 891 So. 2d
621, 622 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
435

Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58.

436

Jones, supra note 433, at 2903.

For example, many state courts interpreting state constitutions have rejected the federal
approach. See, e.g., State v. Morales, 657 A.2d 585, 593–94 (Conn. 1995) (“Fairness dictates that
when a person’s liberty is at stake, the sole fact of whether the police or another state official acted
in good or bad faith in failing to preserve evidence cannot be determinative of whether the criminal
437
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3. Right to Counsel
A movant has no constitutional right to assistance of counsel after the first
appeal.438 According to the U.S. Supreme Court,
We have never held that prisoners have a constitutional right
to counsel when mounting collateral attacks upon their
convictions, and we decline to so hold today. Our cases establish
that the right to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of
right, and no further. Thus, we have rejected suggestions that we
establish a right to counsel on discretionary appeals. We think
that since a defendant has no federal constitutional right to
counsel when pursuing a discretionary appeal on direct review
of his conviction, a fortiori, he has no such right when attacking
a conviction that has long since become final upon exhaustion
of the appellate process.439
The Court characterized collateral attacks on criminal convictions as civil in
nature and even more removed from the criminal trial than discretionary direct
review.440 States, which need not even provide post-conviction relief in the
first place, are not compelled by due process to ensure assistance of counsel in
these proceedings.441
Like many other states, Wyoming’s statute provides counsel to indigent
individuals filing motions for post-conviction DNA testing.442 A needy individual
wishing to submit a motion for post-conviction DNA testing has the right to
counsel during proceedings under the Act.443 This increases the probability that
the Act will provide meaningful relief to innocent prisoners, most of whom lack
the funds to hire their own counsel.
While Innocence Network member organizations like the Rocky Mountain
Innocence Center provide pro bono representation to prisoners with plausible
defendant has received due process of law. Rather, our constitution imposes certain obligations on
the state to insure that the criminal trial is ‘a search for truth, not an adversary game.’”) (quoting
United States v. Perry, 471 F.2d 1057, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1962)).
438

Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1990).

439

Id. (internal citations omitted).

440

Id. at 556–57.

441

Id. at 557.

442

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-12-308 (2013).

Id. The statute provides for counsel to be appointed in accordance with Wyo. Stat. § 7-6104(c)(viii), an apparent typographical error, which likely should refer to Wyo. Stat. § 7-6-104(c)
(vii): “A needy person who is entitled to be represented by an attorney . . . is entitled: . . . [t]o be
represented by the public defender in a motion brought in accordance with the provisions of the
Post-Conviction DNA Testing Act.”
443
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innocence claims, these organizations have limited resources and rely heavily on
volunteers.444 The Act guarantees access to counsel in the event of insufficient
access to pro bono representation. But this may not guarantee effective assistance
of counsel. While many statutes provide for the appointment of counsel in these
circumstances, whether the movant has a right to effective assistance of counsel
in post-conviction proceedings remains unclear.445 Even so, a limited statutory
right to counsel gives prisoners an advantage over their pro se counterparts, who
frequently misunderstand procedural and substantive rules, risking denial of
substantively valid DNA testing motions.

4. Effect of Confessions, Guilty Pleas, and Insufficient Diligence
Wyoming’s statute prohibits a court from ordering post-conviction DNA
testing if the movant pled guilty or no contest.446 This appears to apply to both a
traditional no contest plea, as well as an Alford plea, which courts treat as a guilty
plea, with the same preclusive effect in later civil proceedings.447 The statute also
prohibits a testing order for a movant who went to trial after January 1, 2000 and
failed to request or use DNA testing at trial because of strategic considerations or
insufficient due diligence.448 There is an exception for insufficient due diligence
resulting from ineffective assistance of counsel.449 No showing of due diligence is
required if the movant was convicted before January 1, 2000.450
Given what we now know about the incidence of false confessions and guilty
pleas by people who were later exonerated by DNA testing, the statute should
not prohibit DNA testing orders for individuals who pled guilty or no contest.451
Request Help, Rocky Mountain Innocence Center, http://rminnocence.org/requesthelp/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2014).
444

445

See People v. Love, 727 N.E.2d 680 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).

446

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-12-303(d).

See McEwan v. State, 2013, WY 158, ¶ 15, 314 P.3d 1160, 1165 n.4 (Wyo. 2013) (citing
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (2013)) (distinguishing Alford pleas, in which a defendant
accepts a plea bargain while denying factual guilt in order to avoid a harsher penalty, from no
contest pleas).
447

448

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-12-303(d).

449

Id.

Id. This language suggests that post-conviction testing would be available to a movant who
pled guilty or no contest before January 1, 2000. J.H. Dingfelder Stone, Facing the Uncomfortable
Truth: The Illogic of Post-Conviction DNA Testing for Individuals Who Pleaded Guilty, 45 U.S.F. L.
Rev. 47, 50 n.18 (2010).
450

Kathy Swedlow, Don’t Believe Everything You Read: A Review of Modern “Post-Conviction”
DNA Testing Statutes, 38 Cal. W. L. Rev. 355, 358 (2002) (citing Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (recognizing
that innocent people may plead guilty)).
451

For discussions of the substantial research demonstrating the counterintuitive fact that innocent
people confess, see Gilsi H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Interrogations, Confessions and
Testimony (1996); Drizin & Leo, supra note 337, at 918–21; Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe,
Criminal Law: The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of
Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 429 (1998).
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Although counterintuitive, innocent people confess and plead guilty to crimes for
a variety of reasons, including fear of the death penalty, ineffective assistance of
counsel, incompetence, coercion, and economics.452 Moreover, prohibiting DNA
testing for movants who pled guilty or failed to take seek DNA testing does not
simply punish negligent movants. It also prevents the criminal justice system from
taking the opportunity to expose its own flaws,453 contributing to the problem
of unjustified certainty in the accuracy of criminal verdicts obtained through
faulty eyewitness testimony, forensic science, racial bias, and unethical or incompetent lawyers.

5. Testing Procedure
If the district court orders testing, the Wyoming State Crime Laboratory
will perform the testing unless the movant demonstrates a conflict of interest or
the Crime Laboratory’s inability to perform the necessary testing.454 The statute
requires full disclosure of DNA testing results, including underlying data, to all
parties, the court, and the attorney general.455 Movants must pay for the testing
unless they are imprisoned and needy and the DNA testing provides exculpatory
results.456 These provisions ensure that prisoners have access to testing and its
results, regardless of financial resources.

6. New Trial and Exoneration
If the DNA testing results are inculpatory or inconclusive, the district court
must deny any motion for a new trial based on the evidence and provide the
results to the parole board.457 However, if the results of the DNA testing are
exculpatory, the movant may request a new trial—even if a different statute or
rule, such as Wyoming Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, would bar a new trial
motion.458 The court must set the matter for a hearing on the movant’s new
trial motion.459 At the hearing, the court will likely require the movant to establish
the traditional elements,460 articulated by the Wyoming Supreme Court in
Eunyung Theresa Oh, Note, Innocence after “Guilt”: Postconviction DNA Relief for Innocents
Who Pled Guilty, 55 Syracuse L. Rev. 161, 166–71 (2004).
452

453

Id. at 184.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-12-306(a). If testing is conducted by a different laboratory, the
statute provides requirements to ensure its integrity and reliability. Id. § 7-12-306(b).
454

455

Id. § 7-12-307.

456

Id. § 7-12-309.

457

Id. § 7-12-310(a).

458

Id. § 7-12-303(b).

459

Id. § 7-12-310(b).

At the time of publication of this article, the only order granting a motion for a new trial
based on post-conviction DNA testing relied on the Opie test. See Hearing on Motion for New
Trial, State v. Johnson, No. 19-373 (Wyo. Dist. Ct. Apr. 16, 2013).
460
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Opie v. State, for obtaining a motion for a new trial on the grounds of newly
discovered evidence:
(1) That the evidence has come to his knowledge since the trial;
(2) that it was not owing to the want of due diligence that it did
not come sooner; (3) that it is so material that it would probably
produce a different verdict, if the new trial were granted; and
(4) that it is not cumulative, viz., speaking to facts in relation to
which there was evidence at the trial.461
The district court has discretion to grant a new trial based on these elements.462
Wyoming’s post-conviction DNA testing statute may abrogate the first two
elements of the Opie test. While the statute does not expressly address these
requirements in the context of a hearing on a motion for a new trial, it does
modify the requirements of due diligence and timely discovery in the context of
requesting post-conviction DNA testing.463 For example, the statute requires no
showing of due diligence for trials occurring before 2000.464 It is counterintuitive
that the legislature would intend to authorize testing in circumstances that would
not normally withstand the diligence and timely discovery requirements of the
Opie test, yet not allow the results of such testing to provide the basis of a request
for a new trial.465 In contrast to the materiality or cumulative nature of the test
results, which cannot be determined until after the testing is complete, these facts
should be readily determinable at the initial hearing at which the movant requests
DNA testing.
The third and fourth elements of the Opie test may be the most important
for determining whether DNA testing justifies a new trial. The DNA test results
must be both (1) noncumulative and (2) sufficiently material to the perpetrator’s
identity that they probably would have resulted in a different verdict if they had
been available at trial.466 This raises difficult questions regarding how the court is
to determine whether the test results are sufficiently material to produce a different
verdict. Unlike the hearing to request DNA testing,467 the statute does not state
Opie v. State, 422 P.2d 84, 85 (Wyo. 1967); accord Berry v. State, 10 Ga. 511, 527 (1851)
(articulating an early version of the test).
461

462

Opie, 422 P.2d at 85; Cutbirth v. State, 751 P.2d 1257, 1260 (Wyo. 1988).

463

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-12-303(c).

464

Id.

See Buckles v. State, 622 P.2d 934, 938 (Wyo. 1981) (“[T]he legislature is presumed to
enact legislation that is reasonable and logical and not to intend futile things.”).
465

466
By “different verdict,” the court presumably means a verdict that is more favorable to the
Defendant. Cf. Davis v. State, 2005 WY 93, ¶ 19,117 P.3d 454, 462 (Wyo. 2005) (describing an
error as harmful if, in its absence, the verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant).
467

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-12-305(c).
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whether evidence in the form of an affidavit or testimony may be presented at
the hearing. This complicates matters if interpretation of DNA testing results,
especially in comparison to evidence available to a jury at trial, would benefit
from the presentation of opinion testimony by expert witnesses.468 However,
at least one appellate court in another state interpreted a DNA testing statute
requiring a hearing on the motion for a new trial as giving the movant the right
to an evidentiary hearing.469
If the court grants a new trial, there are two possible, immediate results. First,
the district attorney can stipulate to or move for dismissal of the original charges,
rather than retrying the movant.470 Second, the district attorney can pursue a new
trial, including the charges on which the movant was originally convicted, as well
as charges dismissed during the first trial or not charged under the terms of a plea
agreement.471 This latter possibility may pose new risks for movants who avoided
charges during the first trial.
If the charges are dismissed or the movant is acquitted on retrial, then
the district court must issue orders of actual innocence, exoneration, and
expungement.472 The statute’s use of the mandatory term “shall” 473 means that
the court lacks discretion regarding whether to enter these orders, even if the
district attorney voluntarily drops charges rather than stipulating to the movant’s
innocence. While this requirement may generate some controversy, it plays a
critical role in the innocence event made possible by post-conviction DNA testing
statutes, as explained in Section IV.B above. Forcing the state to pursue a new
trial or risk an order of actual innocence prevents prosecutors from using quiet
dismissals to avoid opportunities for courts, lawyers, and the public to directly
confront the causes and consequences of wrongful convictions.

468
See Wyo. R. Evid. 702 (“If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise.”); Hoy v. DRM, Inc., 2005 WY 76, ¶ 22–23, 114 P.3d 1268, 1280 (Wyo.
2005) (describing Daubert test of reliability and fitness which must be established before admitting
expert testimony into evidence).
469
See Echols v. State, 373 S.W.3d 892, 902 (Ark. 2010) (citing Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112205(a) (effective Aug. 13, 2001) (interpreting Arkansas’s post-conviction statute, which required a
hearing, prompt determination of issues, findings of fact, and conclusions of law, entitled Damien
Echols, of the celebrated West Memphis Three, to an evidentiary hearing).
470

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-12-310(c).

471

Id. §§ 7-12-310(c), -312(b).

Id. §§ 7-12-310(c), (d). An order of expungement results in the court file being placed under
seal and made available for inspection only as authorized by a court order. See id. § 7-13-1401(d).
472

See, e.g., In re LaPage, 18 P.3d 1177, 1180 (Wyo. 2001) (“Where a statute uses the manda
tory language ‘shall,’ a court must obey the statute as a court has no right to make the law contrary
to what is prescribed by the legislature.”).
473
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7. Compensation
Wrongful imprisonment is a terrifying ordeal, which can cause profound
physical, psychological, and emotional damage:
“You’re dead but you’re still alive,” [exoneree Vincent Moto]
said. The violence of prison was terrifying; the hundreds of new
personalities to contend with overwhelming; the lack of control
over any aspect of his life dehumanizing. Being innocent only
compounded his nightmare.
“It’s hard to say how I felt because it was like all of a sudden
your life just makes this 180 degree change, from everything
being fine to a living hell,” said Moto. “I was so angry, so scared,
so confused that crying wasn’t an option.”474
An exoneree’s problems do not end at the prison gates.475 Years or even decades in
prison can cause intense financial, personal, and psychological harm.476 During
that time, a prisoner cannot accumulate a work or residency history, earn more
than nominal income, maintain and develop family and personal relationships,
or pay into Social Security or retirement accounts as a free person would. The
exoneree may have dissipated assets fighting for post-conviction relief. Unless
the exoneree can prove malfeasance by an actor who lacks absolute or qualified
immunity,477 the exoneree may lack a practical civil rights remedy against the
state.478 Unlike a paroled prisoner,479 the exoneree may not have basic services
474

Radnofsky, supra note 63.

Daniel S. Kahn, Presumed Guilty until Proven Innocent: The Burden of Proof in Wrongful
Conviction Claims under State Compensation Statutes, 44 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 123, 129–31 (2010).
475

476
See generally Heather Weigland, Rebuilding a Life: The Wrongfully Convicted and Exoner
ated, 18 Pub. Int. L.J. 427 (2009); Innocence Project, supra note 293; Jeff Deskovic, Catch 22:
Obstacles the Wrongfully Convicted Face upon Release from Prison, Westchester Guardian, July 3,
2008, at 20–21.

See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1361–65 (2011) (reversing $14 million jury
verdict in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim brought by exoneree who was wrongfully convicted following
district attorneys’ failure to train staff regarding disclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence).
477

The State of Wyoming has settled at least one 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights lawsuit filed
by a prisoner who received a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Ben Neary, Wyoming
Settles Lawsuit over Murder Investigation, Casper Star Trib. (Oct. 5, 2013), http://trib.com/news/
local/crime-and-courts/wyoming-settles-lawsuit-over-murder-investigation/article_9c8b30114b23-558f-a123-7e375d068ba7.html. However, that case involved an independent constitutional
violation stemming from the state’s knowing failure to turn over potentially exculpatory evidence.
See Willoughby v. Hanson, No. 12CV 210-S (D. Wyo. Sept 17, 2012) (Complaint).
478

479
Kahn, supra note 475, at 131 (citing Cal. Comm’n on the Fair Admin. of Just.,
Final Report 105 (2008)); see also Program Aims to Help Wyoming Inmates Transition to Outside,
Billings Gazette (Mar. 9, 2013), http://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-regional/wyoming/
program-aims-to-help-wyoming-inmates-transition-to-outside/article_bf7eb963-74af-5d26-9e5f0baf778b4b24.html (describing reentry programs available to Wyoming inmates).
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that might be provided by a probation and parole reentry program to ease the
difficult transition to non-prison life.480 Private charitable resources may be sparse
and difficult to locate. This creates a collective action problem where the public
arguably benefits from imprisoning dangerous people, but does not bear the
costs of wrongful convictions. The innocent exoneree—who may continue to be
scapegoated by prosecutors, politicians, and vigilantes who cling to the “vague
and inchoate suspicion” of guilt 481—bears the primary weight of the injustice.
The precarious position of exonerees demands the need for rehabilitative
assistance from the state, including financial compensation, medical benefits,
education, job training, and counseling.482 This provides a practical method for
sharing at least a small part of the costs of wrongful imprisonment.483 Yet only
twenty-nine states currently offer any kind of post-conviction compensation
statute.484 Many existing statutes fall short of providing adequate financial support
and social services to help exonerees get back on their feet.485 Most exonerees do
not receive compensation equivalent to the federal standard of $50,000 per year
of incarceration.486
Despite legislative efforts during the 2014 Budget Session,487 the State of
Wyoming does not provide statutory compensation, whether monetarily or
through social services, to exonerees. The Wyoming Legislature must rectify this
shortcoming before it can claim to provide justice to the wrongfully convicted.
Other jurisdictions in geographic proximity have adopted favorable compensation
statutes, including Texas ($80,000 per year, plus $25,000 per year on death row,
with no cap), Utah (nonagricultural wage per year, which in 2010 was $38,808
per year 488 with a 15-year cap), and Colorado ($70,000 per year plus $50,000

480

Weigland, supra note 476, at 429.

481

Bernhard, supra note 371, at 717.

482

Weigland, supra note 476, at 435– 37; Innocence Project, supra note 476, at 20–24.

Adele Bernhard, When Justice Fails: Indemnification for Unjust Conviction, 6 U. Chi. L.
Sch. Roundtable 73, 74 (1999); Alberto B. Lopez, $10 and a Denim Jacket? A Model Statute
for Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, 36 Ga. L. Rev. 665, 704 (2002); Lauren C. Boucher,
Comment, Advancing the Argument in Favor of State Compensation for the Erroneously Convicted and
Wrongfully Incarcerated, 56 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1069, 1097 (2007).
483

Innocence Project, supra note 476, at 3– 4. Seventeen of the twenty-nine states fix daily
or annual award amounts, ten provide variable amounts, one provides a fixed amount based on the
years of incarceration, and one provides a fixed amount regardless of the length of incarceration.
Reforms by State, The Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/news/LawView1.php
(last visited Apr. 28, 2014).
484

485

Innocence Project, supra note 476, at 3–4.

486

Id. at 5; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2513(e) (2012) (providing compensation of $50,000 per year).

487

See infra notes 517–45 and accompanying text.

Utah Dept. of Workforce Services, Workforce Research & Analysis, Annual Report of
Labor Market Information (2010).
488
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per year on death row, with no cap).489 Unlike those states, Wyoming has a much
smaller prison population, making it less likely that there will be many claims for
compensation.490 Given the state’s strong financial position,491 it is surprising that
it continues to deny full responsibility for wrongful convictions.

8. Appeals
Wyoming’s statute does not permit a party to directly appeal an order granting
or denying a motion for post-conviction DNA testing.492 However, the movant,
district attorney, or attorney general may file a petition for a writ of review within
twenty days of the court’s order.493 Additionally, an order granting or denying a
motion for a new trial may be appealed to the Wyoming Supreme Court.494 It is
likely such an order would be reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard
articulated by the Wyoming Supreme Court in Opie v. State 495 and widely applied
to motions for new criminal trials.496 Appellate courts in other states have used the
abuse of discretion standard to reverse denials of new trial motions based on DNA
evidence.497 The Wyoming Supreme Court’s willingness to find that a district
court has abused this discretion remains an open question. At the very least, an
appeal may result in an opportunity for oral argument and a written opinion,
possibly contributing to public exposure of the problem of wrongful convictions.

9. Beyond DNA
For all of the benefits of post-conviction DNA testing and innocence claims,
they cannot address all of the problems with the criminal justice system. One
lesson to learn from our former reliance on eyewitness identification, discredited
forensic science, and procedural safeguards,498 is the risk that certainty in the

489
See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.§ 103.001 (West 2013); Utah Code Ann. § 78B9-405 (West 2013), Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-65-101 to -103 (2014).
490
In fact, the Budget and Fiscal Section of the LSO assumes “that the actual number of
individuals affected would be very low.” LSO, 2014 Budget Session—Fiscal Note—SF0030, http://
legisweb.state.wy.us/2014/Fiscal/SF0030.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2014).

Wyo. Consensus Revenue Estimating Group, Wyo. State Government Revenue ForeFiscal Year 2014–Fiscal Year 2018 (2014), http://eadiv.state.wy.us/creg/GreenCREG_
Jan14.pdf.
491

cast,

492

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-12-313(a) (2013).

493

Id.

494

Id. § 7-12-313(b).

495

See Opie v. State, 422 P.2d 84, 85 (Wyo. 1967).

496

See, e.g., Moore v. State, 2013 WY 120, ¶ 13, 309 P.3d 1242, 1245 (Wyo. 2013).

See, e.g., State v. Palmer, 808 N.W.2d 623 (Neb. 2012); In re Bradford, 165 P.3d 31, 33–34
(Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
497

498

See supra notes 50–122, 196–210 and accompanying text.
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system’s accuracy may be illusory. While DNA testing provides near certain
results, particularly in comparison to non-DNA identification methods,499 it
may provide diminishing marginal returns.500 In the future, a greater number of
cases involving biological evidence will be subject to highly accurate DNA testing
before trial.501 There is a real danger that an insular innocence movement centered
on DNA testing may replicate the problems of habeas relief, creating “special
procedures only for those who can assert the possibility, or probability, of factual
innocence rather than the maintenance of far more costly general protections for
all defendants,” at the expense of enthusiasm for more general reforms.502
Concerns about the detrimental effect of an exclusive focus on innocence
and DNA testing are well taken. Many problems with the criminal justice system
cannot be cured by claims of factual innocence. For example, the system may
have serious problems with mass incarceration of the guilty,503 racial and class
bias,504 inhumane conditions and treatment,505 and a destructive war on drugs.506
The dismal record of faith in the reliability of verdicts relying on procedural and
evidentiary norms should caution us against viewing a particular technology or
legal tool as a panacea for the system’s problems. For example, biological evidence
is unavailable in the majority of criminal investigations.507 It therefore makes
sense that most DNA exonerations involve murder and sexual assault convictions,
which are much more likely to involve an assailant leaving genetic material at the
scene of the crime.508 This suggests that the current wave of exonerations may

Moenssens, Inbau & Starrs, Scientific Evidence
1986); Garrett, supra note 125, at 1647–48.
499

in

Criminal Cases 358–359 (3d ed.

Daniel S. Medwed, Up the River Without a Procedure: Innocent Prisoners and Newly
Discovered Non-DNA Evidence in State Courts, 47 Ariz. L. Rev. 655, 656–61 (2005).
500

501

Liebman, supra note 124, at 547–48.

Steiker & Steiker, supra note 39, at 615; accord Abbe Smith, In Praise of the Guilty Project: A
Criminal Defense Lawyer’s Growing Anxiety about Innocence Projects, 13 U. Pa. J.L. & Soc. Change
315 (2009–2010).
502

503

See supra notes 358– 60 and accompanying text.

David Cole, No Equal Justice: Race
System 4 –5 (1999).
504

and

Class

in the

American Criminal Justice

505
Lisa Guenther, The Living Death of Solitary Confinement, N.Y. Times (Aug. 26, 2012),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/26/the-living-death-of-solitary-confinement/;
Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1924 & n.1 (2010) (describing conditions in California’s over
crowded prisons).

See generally, e.g., Brian Gilmore, Again and Again We Suffer: The Poor and the Endurance of
the “War on Drugs,” 15 UDC L. Rev. 59 (2011).
506

Limits to Doubt in Capital Cases, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 2003, at A1 (“DNA exonerations
are most common in rape cases. The large majority of felonies do not involve biological evidence.”);
Death Penalty Overhaul: Congressional Testimony Before the Comm. on Senate Judiciary, 107th Cong.
(June 18, 2002) (testimony of Barry Scheck).
507

508

Gross et al., supra note 72, at 528–29.
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only address the tip of the iceberg, failing to provide collateral relief for unknown
numbers of individuals convicted of crimes for which biological evidence and
DNA testing were unavailable.509 Innocence advocates should be careful to
acknowledge that, while DNA can provide near certainty in some situations, it is
extremely unlikely we will ever develop an irrefutable scientific means of proving
innocence or guilt in every case.510
To avoid complacency, advocates would benefit from using the inertia provided
by the DNA testing revolution and innocence events to push for further reforms.
One way to address the problem is for state legislatures to adopt post-conviction
relief statutes expressly addressing newly discovered non-DNA evidence. The
Wyoming Legislature’s Interim Joint Judiciary Committee introduced such a
bill in the 2014 Budget Session: Senate File 28.511 The bill was similar to the
post-conviction DNA testing statute, except it permitted a motion for a new trial
on the grounds of non-DNA evidence.512 In addition to other requirements, the
motion would have to:
(i) Identify with specificity newly discovered material evidence,
other than DNA evidence, which if proven would establish by
clear and convincing evidence the movant is actually innocent;
(ii) Be supported by affidavit based on personal knowledge of
the affiant or similar credible evidence showing that the movant
is actually innocent;
(iii) Show there is an absence of available state corrective process
to establish the movant is actually innocent; and
(iv) Be supported by evidence other than recantations of
testimony or statements or impeachment evidence.513
This groundbreaking bill would allow Wyoming to join Utah as one of the few
states permitting such motions.514 But, as explained in more detail in the next
subsection, a last minute series of controversial amendments caused it to die at
the end of the session.515
509
Garrett, supra note 72, at 60; Gross et al., supra note 72, at 528–31; Medwed, supra note
380, at 131–32; Rosen, supra note 202, at 69–70.
510

Steiker & Steiker, supra note 39, at 618.

511

S.F. 28, 62d Leg., Budg. Sess. (Wyo. 2014).

512

Id.

513

Id.

Nic Caine, Factually Innocent without DNA? An Analysis of Utah’s Factual Innocence Statute,
2013 Utah L. Rev. OnLaw 258 (2013) (citing Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-402; Va. Code Ann.
§ 19.2-327.10).
514

515

See infra notes 517– 45 and accompanying text.
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Even if states adopt non-DNA post-conviction statutes, it is unlikely they will
address all wrongfully convicted persons, particularly if evidence is destroyed or
unavailable. Hence the need for broader policies to uncover the causes of wrongful
conviction—tunnel vision, undue reliance on questionable eyewitness testimony,
unreliable jailhouse snitch testimony, inadequate public defender resources, false
confessions, systemic racism, etc.—at their source. Such measures should make
it easier to identify innocent individuals before they are convicted, reducing the
need for collateral remedies. While the details and specifics of such reforms are
beyond the scope of this article, some suggestions include:


Judicial recognition of freestanding innocence claims;



Innocence commissions that proactively investigate potential
wrongful convictions;



Improved eyewitness identification procedures;



Videotaping interrogations;



More transparency regarding criminal prosecutions, including
disclosure of evidence falling short of Brady’s exculpatory
requirement; and



Rigorous standards for forensic science evidence.516

These suggestions are far from exhaustive. Moreover, these particular
suggestions may not address more systemic problems, including race and class bias
endemic in our society and political institutions. They are merely building blocks
for more systemic reforms of the criminal justice and penal systems. Even these
suggestions entail massive, difficult efforts, especially given the strong interests
and traditions supporting the status quo. Advocates for criminal defendants,
prisoners, and exonerees must come to terms with the fact that their work is
never finished. Nevertheless, it is important for innocence movement advocates to
continue to link their work to broader social and legal goals—forcing individuals
and institutions to confront their anxiety over the criminal justice system, rather
than simply repressing or denying it. As long as we keep larger goals in mind and
are not lulled into a false sense of complacency, small reforms can provide the first
steps toward more meaningful change. That can help us to avoid the stagnancy of
cynically accepting the inevitability of the status quo.

For discussions of future legal reforms, see Garrett, supra note 125, at 1636–37; Rosen,
supra note 204, at 256–87.
516
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D. The Uncertain Future of Post-conviction Relief in Wyoming
Prior to 2014, the innocence movement succeeded in cooperating with
Wyoming lawmakers and prosecutors to improve the methods for obtaining
effective post-conviction innocence relief. Despite the Act’s beneficial features, the
state lacked statutes providing post-conviction relief based on non-DNA evidence
and any kind of statutory compensation for exonerated individuals. In 2008,
legislators removed compensation provisions from the Act to ensure its passage,
with the hopes of addressing the compensation issue in a later session.517 Wyoming
therefore remained one of the twenty-one states with no form of compensation
for exonerated persons.518
Before the 2014 Budget Session, the Wyoming Legislature appeared poised
to close these gaps. The Joint Interim Judiciary Committee of the Wyoming
Legislature, in cooperation with the Rocky Mountain Innocence Center, drafted
and introduced two bills that would build on the 2008 Post-Conviction DNA
Testing Act. The first bill, Senate File 28 (SF 28), would allow a motion for a
new trial on the grounds of newly discovered non-DNA evidence.519 As discussed
above, DNA exonerations may simply be the tip of the iceberg and more must be
done to address cases involving new, non-biological evidence.520 The companion
bill, Senate File 30 (SF 30), would allow exonerated persons to obtain financial
compensation from the State of Wyoming in the form of an annuity in lieu of filing
a civil claim.521 Both bills would represent important steps towards addressing the
causes and consequences of wrongful convictions.
Initial signs were promising. Both bills had powerful committee backing and
near total support upon introduction to the Senate Judiciary Committee and the
full Senate.522 The Senate approved a number of amendments to SF 30, including
an increase in the total amount of compensation from $75 to $100 per day of
incarceration, an increase of maximum compensation from $300,000 to $500,000,
and an appropriation.523 The Senate also made changes requested by Wyoming
prosecutors: changing administration of the compensation program from the
Department of Administration and Information to the Attorney General’s Office
House Committee of the Whole, 62d Legis., Budget Sess. (Wyo. Mar. 4, 2014) (statement
of Rep. Keith Gingery), available at http://legisweb.state.wy.us/2014/audio/house/h0305am1.mp3.
517

See Reforms by State, The Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/news/
LawView1.php (last visited Apr. 28, 2014).
518

519

Supra note 511 and accompanying text.

520

See supra notes 498–516 and accompanying text.

521

S.F. 30, 62d Leg., Budg. Sess. (Wyo. 2014).

See S.F. 28, Digest, http://legisweb.state.wy.us/2014/Digest/SF0028.htm (last visited Apr.
28, 2014); S.F. 30, Digest, http://legisweb.state.wy.us/2014/Digest/SF0030.htm (last visited Apr.
28, 2014).
522

523

S.F. 30, Digest, supra note 522.
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and increasing the number of days within which a district attorney must respond
to a request for a new trial based on non-DNA evidence.524
Despite these early signs of support, both bills died on the last day of the 2014
session.525 The first warning signs appeared when, at the request of prosecutors, the
House Judiciary Committee recommended an apparently small amendment to
SF 28’s requirement that the district court enter an order of actual innocence and
exoneration.526 The Committee recommended giving the district court judge full
discretion to grant or refuse to grant an order of actual innocence and exoneration.
A denial would not be subject to appeal.527 It is difficult to imagine courts entering
many actual innocence and exoneration orders under this language. The state has
a financial interest in preventing exonerations to avoid lawsuits and compensation
claims. Prosecutors could simply drop charges to deprive exonerees of so much
as a hearing on the merits of their cases for innocence. At that point, the district
court would have nothing other than the new evidence, unaided by expert witness
testimony, combined with the district attorney’s allusions, to determine a movant’s
factual innocence. In addition to denying the exoneree a procedure for receiving
an order vindicating their innocence, this interferes with the innocence event
provided by true post-conviction exonerations.528
When the House Judiciary Committee initially reviewed SF 30, it made
positive amendments to the statute. It clarified that compensation is available
to movants who request it within two years after receiving an order of actual
innocence and exoneration, even those who received an order before SF 30’s
effective date.529 The Committee also made beneficial financial changes by
(1) removing limits on permissible annuity beneficiaries, (2) clarifying interaction
with Wyoming’s summary probate statute, and (3) protecting the annuity from
the movant’s creditors.530
The supportive atmosphere shifted when the House Judiciary Committee
reconvened to recommend amendments to SF 30. Speaker of the House Tom
Lubnau, R-Gillette, proposed an amendment requiring movants to request new
hearings to prove their own innocence by a preponderance of the evidence before
receiving compensation.531 Representatives then introduced and debated a flurry
S.F. 30, Digest, supra note 522; S.F. 28, http://legisweb.state.wy.us/2014/Digest/SF0028.
htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2014).
524

Kyle Roerink, Lawmakers Kill Compensation Bill, Casper Star-Trib., Mar. 7, 2014, at A1;
James Chilton, Payback Denied for Johnson, Wyo. Trib.-Eagle, Mar. 7, 2014, at A6.
525

526

S.F. 28, Digest, supra note 524.

527

See S.F. 28, supra note 511.

528

See supra notes 339–88 and accompanying text.

529

S.F. 30, http://legisweb.state.wy.us/2014/Digest/SF0030.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2014).

530

Id.

531

Id.
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of new amendments to SF 28 and 30 during the second and third readings.532 Some
Representatives identified the oddity of the last minute string of amendments,
at least one of which arrived, unread, on Representatives’ desks fifteen minutes
before the third reading.533 The final version passed by the House (1) required
movants who already received an order of actual innocence and exoneration
to return to court to prove their innocence in an unprecedented new kind of
fact-finding hearing and (2) stayed expungement of the record until the period
for requesting compensation had passed.534 Recall that, to receive a new trial, a
movant must have already met the incredibly high standard of proving that
the original trial would have resulted in a different verdict if the evidence was
available.535 That showing results in vacation of the original sentence, a renewed
presumption of innocence, and, if the charges or dropped or the movant is
acquitted, a finding of factual innocence. Yet this amendment would put the
movant in the unusual position of having to return to court to prove his or her
own innocence a second time.
As explained above, recent exonerees typically lack even basic financial
resources.536 They often find it difficult to simply survive during the difficult
adjustment from prison life and are unprepared to fight new legal battles. Such
individuals may have to retain new counsel to obtain compensation, which might
demand contingency fees. As a matter of policy, requiring an exoneree to prove
his or her innocence a second time is redundant and serves little purpose other
than placing new burdens on people already irreparably harmed by the justice
system, while possibly lining the pockets of a few defense attorneys otherwise
unable to obtain contingency fees for their services.537 Even worse, this procedure
would shift all of the terrible costs of wrongful imprisonment onto an innocent
person, presuming that person guilty until proven innocent and washing all of

“While not constitutionally required, the rules of the House and Senate require that all
bills be read three times with each reading on a different day.” Wyo. Legislature, Wyo. Manual of
Legislative Procedures (2014), available at http://legisweb.state.wy.us/lsoweb/LegRules.aspx.
532

House Committee of the Whole, 62d Legis., Budget Sess. (Wyo. Mar. 4, 2014) (statement of
Rep. Cathy Connolly), available at http://legisweb.state.wy.us/2014/audio/house/h0305am1.mp3.
533

The latter requirement appears to be based on a misinterpretation of the term “expunge
ment,” which seals records from public access, rather than destroying them. See Wyo. Stat. Ann.
§ 7-13-401(j)(i) (2013).
534

535

See Opie v. State, 422 P.2d 84, 85 (Wyo. 1967).

536

See generally Innocence Project, supra note 294.

Rule 3.1(d)(2) prohibits a lawyer from agreeing to, charging, or collecting “a contingent fee
for representing a defendant in a criminal case.” Wyo. R. Prof’l Conduct 3.1(d)(2). While it is not
completely clear whether this rule would apply to unusual quasi-criminal proceeding contemplated
by the amendment, it is possible that such a proceeding would be considered more analogous to a
civil claim against the state.
537

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2014

75

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 14 [2014], No. 2, Art. 7

630

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 14

our hands of an injustice perpetrated on our behalf.538 Shifting the burden to
innocent victims is profoundly unjust, especially considering the state’s superior
access to the evidence—including the rationale for the decision to drop charges, if
that is the case—and the procedure’s inconsistency with our system’s longstanding
presumption of innocence.539 The amendment would also arguably reduce the
state’s incentive to stop wrongful convictions.540
The last minute attempts to interfere with SF 28 and 30 resulted in both
bills dying at the close of the 2014 session. Appointees to the Joint Conference
Committee could not resolve the differences between the House and Senate
versions of the bills.541 Consequently, as this article is being prepared for
publication, Wyoming citizens have no practical access to compensation for
wrongful incarceration or options for challenging wrongful convictions with
newly discovered non-DNA evidence. Whether this was the intended result of the
House’s late amendments is unclear. Yet the consequences of the failure are real.
The bills’ failure not only risks continued suffering by innocent individuals—who
lack access to financial resources or even a means of clearing their names—but
also undermines public confidence in the Wyoming criminal justice system. This
represents another attempt to use denial and repression to ward off the anxiety
posed by the image of the innocent prisoner.542
This apparent strategy of attempting to erase the fact of innocence is not
surprising. No one enjoys confronting the trauma of systemic failings. But it is
questionable how long this illusion can be sustained, particularly in the face of
growing public perception that the system is broken and that courts, lawyers, and
policymakers have a duty to correct the system’s mistakes rather than continue
the futile task of trying to conceal them. Until the law is changed, exonerated
individuals will continue to struggle to survive their newfound freedom and
imprisoned individuals lacking an avenue to challenge their convictions with
non-DNA evidence will continue to have their requests for relief dismissed by
courts as “frivolous.”
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Adam I. Kaplan, Comment, The Case for Comparative Fault in Compensating the Wrongfully
Convicted, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 227, 240, 255–56 (2008) (citing H. Archibald Kaiser, Wrongful
Conviction and Imprisonment: Towards an End to the Compensatory Obstacle Course, 9 Windsor Y.B.
Access Just. 96, 103 (1989)) (arguing that, while reduction may be permissible in some situations,
the state should not scapegoat innocent victims to deny responsibility for its errors).
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Post-conviction innocence claims have the strong potential to use human
empathy to challenge unjustified certainty in the criminal justice system and
condemnation of convicts. But the Wyoming Legislature’s surprising failure
to provide meaningful compensation and non-DNA exoneration procedures
illustrates the substantial backlash faced by a movement that attempts to
expose the system’s failing. These events appear to confirm the fears of Professor
Adele Bernhard:
“It’s serendipity,” said Bernhard. “There is no constituency in
favor of this kind of [compensation] legislation because people
don’t really think it will happen to them.” The majority of the
wrongfully convicted who have been exonerated are black and
poor. Bernhard said their lives, free or behind bars, are simply
not valued highly enough.543
Professor Bernhard may be incorrect, at least in the State of Wyoming. The
Legislature’s failure to pass Senate Files 28 and 30 inspired public condemnations
by newspaper editorial boards 544 and the public.545 Yet for now, we remain
uncertain of Wyoming policymakers’ willingness to take meaningful steps to
correct and prevent wrongful convictions.

Conclusion
It is difficult to cope with the idea that the very legal procedures and structures
we create to protect us from harm can imprison and kill us if we have done nothing
wrong. It is clearly an injustice when someone is the victim of a violent crime.
But that injustice is only magnified if the criminal justice system apprehends and
punishes the wrong person. The harm is compounded when racial minorities and
economically disempowered groups suffer a disproportionate weight of wrongful
convictions. We know that the rate of such injustice is not insubstantial. The
primary reason we know this is not due so much to clever improvements in
procedural protections, but because of the disruptive intervention of DNA testing,
as well as the dogged work of individuals comprising the innocence movement,
and the families and friends of the wrongfully convicted. However comforting
our trust in the criminal justice system’s results, one can no longer retain absolute
faith in that system’s accuracy.
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The State of Wyoming has a choice in how to cope with this knowledge. We
can insist that nothing is wrong and deny powerful evidence of institutional failure
and injustice. Or we can take important steps to confront the source of our anxiety
and face reality. That requires us to take ownership of our collective mistakes by
acknowledging the once-invisible face of the innocent prisoner, compensating
the innocent, and trying to determine and prevent the causes of wrongful
convictions. Yet we should resist being lulled into complacency by the successes
of the innocence movement and post-conviction DNA testing. The traumatic
event of exoneration will remain isolated, rather than truly transformative, unless
we attempt to remain faithful to it by continually pursuing new avenues for
uncovering and correcting injustice. Exonerations should provide one step in
a broader process of reexamining faulty assumptions regarding innocence and
guilt, providing one step of many down the road to accomplishing more systemic
changes to the criminal justice system.
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